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Violence against police officers is a major problem in America.  Previous studies on 
violence and police officers have usually focused on violence by police officers, not 
violence against police officers.  This study is the first of its kind as it examines violence 
against police officers from a comprehensive, criminal events perspective with detailed 
use of force/officer violence data collected by the Orlando Police Department.  
Individual officer characteristics, individual offender characteristics, situational variables, 
and geographical factors are considered.  Logistic regression results indicate that use of 
force incidents are more likely to involve battery against one or more police officers 
when multiple officers are involved, when offenders are female, when offenders are of 
larger size (measured by weight), and when offenders are known to have recently 
consumed alcohol before the incident.  Spatial analysis results indicate that there is 
significant clustering of batteries against police officers within the City of Orlando, and 
that the areas where police battery is predominant are very similar to areas where 
alcohol-related businesses are prevalent, and theoretically, more alcohol is consumed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
  
“One of the first things that’s imbued upon you when you come on this job is never think 
this guy is gonna come peaceful.  Always assume he’s gonna fight like Satan.  With 
anybody at all.” 
-anonymous Chicago PD officer (Fletcher, 1990, p.16) 
 
 
Violence is a common occurrence for law enforcement officers.  Patrol officers 
see violence on a regular basis and are often personally involved.  In 2008 alone, the 
FBI reports that 58,792 officers were assaulted, or about 11.3 officers were assaulted 
per 100 officers in the US (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).  Furthermore, over a 
quarter of those assaulted were injured during the assault (n=15,345), and 41 of the 
officers were feloniously killed (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).  The frequency 
of violence against officers has decreased slightly over the past few years, but is still 
much higher than the levels of 1960 when officer deaths totaled 28 (Chapman, 1998).  
While we are headed in the right direction, there is still a lot of work to be done to 
protect the officers who protect us every day. 
There are many reasons that we should want to learn more about violence 
against police officers.  Obviously, we want the officers themselves to be as safe as 
possible, but there are other types of costs besides the psychological and emotional 
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issues associated with being the victim of violent crime.  When an officer is assaulted or 
battered, time and money are lost.  There are tangible costs associated with all facets of 
the violent encounter, including lost work time or reduced-duty time due to injury or 
additional paperwork, in addition to medical costs, including ambulance services, 
hospital and doctor visits, and medications—and most (if not all) of these costs come 
from government funds, which, of course, come from citizens’ tax dollars.   
According to the work of Robert Kaminski, foot pursuits alone in Los Angeles 
County, California, resulted in an assault on one or more deputies in 42% of incidents 
and injury to at least one deputy in 16.9% of incidents, including minor injuries such as 
bruises and sprains as well as more serious injuries such as fractures and human bites 
(Kaminski, 2010).  A similar study of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department in South 
Carolina (Kaminski, 2007) found that force was used against deputies in about one in 
three foot pursuits, and nearly 40% of those pursuits involved serious force used 
against the deputies, such as weapon use or fist or foot strikes.  Thirty-three percent of 
the deputies reported being intentionally injured by suspects during at least one foot 
pursuit, with injuries ranging from very minor injuries which did not require treatment to 
serious injuries requiring overnight hospital stays.  The costs of the intentional foot 
pursuit injuries at Richland County were substantial, with a total of 273 days work lost 
and 358 reduced-duty capacity work days (Kaminski, 2007), and of course this does not 
include the costs of the medical care that was required due to these injuries. 
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In the past, many studies have focused on the connection between police officers 
and violence, but most of those studies have focused on the use of force by the police 
rather than violence used against the police (see, for example: Gallo, Collyer, & 
Gallagher, 2008; Hoffman & Hickey, 2005; Kaminski, DiGiovanni, & Downs, 2004; 
Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill, & Paoline, 2005; McElvain & Kposowa, 
2004; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2004; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2006; Paoline & Terrill, 
2007; Terrill, Leinfelt, & Kwak, 2008).  Even so, there is a growing body of work 
regarding the police officer as a victim.  Most of these studies look for general correlates 
of violence against police, but very few of them attempt to provide a solid theoretical 
explanation for such incidents, and those that do are often limited in the effectiveness of 
their explanations.  Social events, especially crimes, are complicated by nature, and 
therefore any viable attempt to explain these events will require a more thorough 
examination than has been conducted in the past. 
The current study is intended to increase the understanding of violence against 
police officers and the factors that lead officers who use force against a suspect to be 
battered by that suspect1.  This will be accomplished through the comparison of use of 
force arrests involving officer battery with use of force arrests not involving officer 
battery.  Data on violence against officers collected from the Orlando Police Department 
will be examined through the framework of the criminal events perspective, a 
                                            
1
 Throughout the study, violence against police officers will be discussed in different terms.  This may be 
referred to as police violence, police assault, police battery, or police murder.  In all of these instances, 
the study is referring to violence against the police, not violence by the police. 
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comprehensive approach to studying crime incidents, which is explained in further detail 
below.  By gaining a better understanding of these situations and what leads to them, 
we will have a better understanding of how to effectively protect officers through policy 
changes and training recommendations.  After a review of relevant existing literature, 
the methodology of the study will be discussed, followed by results, discussion, and 








The studies that have accumulated so far about violence against the police have 
uncovered several factors which may affect the frequency of these incidents.  These 
studies usually focus on either general resistance against officers, assaults and 
batteries against officers, or the unlawful deaths of officers. 
 
Resistance against Officers 
 
 While there have been few attempts to estimate how often suspects resist arrest, 
we know that suspect resistance occurs on a regular basis.  Garner and Maxwell (2002) 
report that suspects use physical force during an arrest in about 1 in 6 cases.  When a 
subject resists arrest, the extent of the resistance might be passive, or the offender 
might resist by assaulting or battering the officer.  In extreme circumstances the 
encounter might end with the officer’s and/or offender’s serious injury or death.  Suspect 




 Few studies have been conducted on the possible predictors of suspect 
resistance.  The notable exception is a study of police use of force and suspect 
resistance in Phoenix, Arizona (Garner & Maxwell, 2002).  In their study of 1,585 adult 
custody arrests, the authors found that in 61.6% of the arrests, the suspects offered no 
resistance.  In 12.4% of the arrests, the suspects offered psychological or verbal 
resistance only, and in almost 9% of arrests, the suspects used or threatened to use a 
weapon or physical tactic.  Many of the potential predictors of force by police officer or 
suspect turned out to have no effect or an inconsistent effect on the probability of force 
being used.  Among factors found to significantly predict suspect use of force were 
increased numbers of police officers, bystanders being present, alcohol impairment of 
the suspect, gang involvement, and violent offenses.   
 Of the few other studies regarding suspect resistance, the results were rather 
ambiguous.  Two of three major studies found race of the offender to be an indicator of 
high levels of resistance.  Belvedere, Worrall, and Tibbetts (2005) found that in southern 
California black suspects were more likely to resist when being arrested by white, black, 
or Hispanic officers and white suspects were less likely to resist when being arrested by 
black or Hispanic officers.  Engel (2003) found that in Rochester, St. Louis, and 
Tampa/St. Petersburg, non-white suspects were less likely to comply with white officers.  
It should be noted, however, that this study used data that were collected thirty years 
ago, and it is unknown whether or not trends have changed since that time. 
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None of these studies indicated that any officer characteristics were predictors of 
resistance, but several suspect characteristics were deemed as important, such as 
suspects being female (females were more likely to be disrespectful toward officers than 
males) (Engel, 2003), intoxicated, disrespectful, and arrested for serious or violent 
crimes (Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Kavanagh, 1997).  Contrary to these findings, 
however, Belvedere and colleagues (2005) found that offense seriousness did not affect 
the likelihood of resistance by the suspect.  Kavanagh (1997) also found that when 
suspects were in the presence of other suspects they were more likely to resist, but 
Garner and Maxwell (2002) found resistance more likely when there were more police 
officers and/or bystanders around.  Situational factors deemed most important for 
predicting resistance were: contact initiated by the officer (as opposed to being initiated 
by a call for service) and night-time incidents (Kavanagh, 1997), as well as beat area.  
Beat areas commonly considered as dangerous by police were much more likely to 
breed suspect resistance than other geographical areas (Belvedere et al., 2005). 
 
Assaults and Batteries against Officers 
 
Assaults and batteries against police officers involve intentional, physical attacks 
and do not include mere passive resistance, although such attacks might occur while 
resisting.  Some sources report that police assaults have decreased consistently in 
recent years (e.g. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training or 
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CA POST, 2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008), while others argue that the 
number of assaults is generally static (e.g. Brandl, 1996).  The FBI’s Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed and Assaulted (hereafter referred to as LEOKA) data indicate a very 
slight decrease in the rate of officers assaulted over the past five years (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2009) (see Figure 1).  Research on assaults against police has been 
more prolific than on resistance in general, and several factors have been advanced 
which appear to correlate with these incidents.  
 
 
Figure 1: Rate of Officers Assaulted per 100 Sworn Officers by Year (FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed 
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A study conducted by Toch (1992) shows that the major motivations for police 
assaults in general are in defending personal autonomy (i.e. not being touched or told 
what to do), defending others, and efforts to escape.  The FBI (1997) found in a study of 
serious police assaults (which included cases of attempted but unsuccessful murder) 
that 38% of the incidents were committed to avoid arrest or to escape, 19% were 
attempts to kill the officer(s), 14% were attempts to frighten the officer(s), 7% were 
attempts to wound, and 2% were attempts to immobilize the officer(s) (the remaining 
20% gave no answer to this question).  Sixty-four percent of the offenders in these 
cases stated that the attack was impulsive rather than planned, and one-fourth stated 
that there was nothing that officers could have done to prevent the attacks.  Those 
offenders who suggested that the officers did contribute to the attack stated that the 
officers might have avoided said attacks by waiting for backup, discontinuing the arrest, 
treating the offenders with “dignity and respect,” properly identifying themselves, acting 
calm, or immediately arresting them upon arrival at the scene (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1997).  
The “average” offender who seriously assaults a police officer (to the extent that 
there is such a person) is male, in his mid-20s, single, and around 5’9” (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 1997).  The offender is usually in good general health and almost 
always has a criminal history (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006).  At the time of the 
assault, the offender has often recently used drugs, alcohol, or both (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2006; Stetzer, 2001).   
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Most serious officer assaults occur in situations when the officer has initiated 
contact with the offender rather than being called to the scene (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1997).  When the assaults do occur in response to calls, the calls are 
usually of a disturbance nature (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).  
The officer almost always arrives at the scene of an eventual serious assault in a 
vehicle, and usually it is a one-officer vehicle although other officers may be on scene or 
nearby.  Almost half of the offenders also arrive in vehicles, but almost half are also in 
the company of others upon arrival (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2006).  The assaults usually occur outdoors, either on a 
highway or roadway or in an alley.  Although time frames are more difficult to agree 
upon as some studies find that the most common time frame is 12PM-12AM, some 
state that it is 10PM-2AM, and still others find it to be 4PM-midnight; most studies do 
agree that the most common times for officer assaults are during the hours of darkness 
(Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2006; Meyer, Magedanz, Dahlin, & Chapman, 1981).  The slight discrepancies in these 
times may be due to geographical differences as some studies cover assaults 
nationwide while others focus only on one area, such as a specific city.   
Only a few studies mention the days of the week that are most prominent for 
police violence.  Meyer et al. (1981) report that officer assaults are more common on 
the weekend days.  The FBI’s LEOKA data report that most officer deaths from 1999 to 
2008 occurred on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, although there were spikes of 
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incidents almost every day of the week during at least one year (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2009).  This source does not report the days of the week most common 
for assaults in general, however, only felonious officer deaths.  Only one other study 
was found to have examined days of the week for assaults, and that study also 
examined lethal assaults only.  Among lethal assaults on officers that occurred between 
1995 and 1999 in California, none occurred on Monday, four occurred on Tuesday, five 
occurred on Wednesday, four occurred on Thursday, eight occurred on Friday, five 
occurred on Saturday, and seven occurred on Sunday (California Commission on 
Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001).  While no particular day stands out as 
most dangerous in these cases, it does appear that weekends are the most dangerous 
times in general. 
Another crucial factor in police assaults involves weapon use.  The most 
frequently chosen type of weapon by far for general police assaults is personal 
weapons, which include hands, feet, and other body parts (Brandl, 1996; California 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001).  Almost four out of five 
assaults on officers employed personal weapons, about 5% employed firearms, 2.5% 
employed knives, and about 14% involved other types of deadly weapons (California 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2001).  Officers were generally 




Serious assaults on officers (those that attempted to kill the officer but were 
unsuccessful) told a much different story.  The weapons of choice in these attacks were 
by far firearms, usually handguns.  Most often the gun was brought to the scene by the 
offender, about half of which had been involved in previous shootings in some way (as 
either the shooter or the victim).  The primary reason reported for the choice of 
particular gun was availability, followed by familiarity.  In these more serious assaults, 
only 40% of officers who were assaulted with firearms were able to fire back during the 
assault (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).  While it is often assumed that the use 
of a weapon means that injury is more likely, Kaminski and Sorensen (1995) actually 
found that in Baltimore County, Maryland, injury was more likely when personal 
weapons (i.e. bodily force) were used rather than other types of weapons. 
Other weapons at the disposal of police officers (besides firearms) have been 
studied, though not extensively.  Robert Kaminski has conducted several studies on 
police assault incidents and intermediate officer weapons, including some work on the 
relationship between the use of oleoresin capsicum spray, or OC spray (pepper spray), 
and officer assaults.  Kaminski, Edwards, and Johnson (1998) tested the “Velcro effect,” 
which refers to the compliance of an offender after hearing the officer open the Velcro 
pouch (or in some cases the snap pouch) containing his OC spray.  The idea behind the 
Velcro effect is that further violence is deterred when threatened with the spray because 
many offenders have either experienced OC personally or have heard about its effects.  
OC spray has been widely adopted as a defensive weapon by police agencies but has 
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not been studied extensively.  Kaminski and colleagues tested the Velcro effect by 
comparing police assaults both before and after the adoption of OC spray in Baltimore 
County and found that the weapon had a statistically significant effect on officer 
assaults, decreasing incidents by 3.2 per month (Kaminski et al., 1998). 
Another intermediate weapon of officers which is now widely used is the 
conducted energy device, or CED (i.e. Taser).  Smith, Kaminski, Rojek, Alpert, and 
Mathis (2007) studied the impact of the CED on officer and suspect injuries in two 
agencies.  In one agency, the CED made both officer and suspect injury less likely as 
well as reducing the seriousness of suspect injuries.  In the other agency, CEDs were 
not found to decrease the odds of injury, but pepper spray was.  The authors concluded 
that while more research is needed on CEDs, their use and the use of pepper spray 
could reduce the likelihood of injury to both officers and suspects, especially over hand-
to-hand combat techniques, which are more likely to cause injury.   
Another factor that appears to be important in understanding police assaults, 
both regionally and by areas as small as neighborhoods, is the geographic area in 
which the assault occurs.  Officers are assaulted more often in the South than in any 
other region of the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).  It also 
appears that in at least some jurisdictions, as with resistance in general, certain smaller 
areas such as neighborhoods are overrepresented (generally those areas widely 
considered to be “bad neighborhoods”) (Stetzer, 2001).  Kaminski, Jefferis, and Gu 
(2003) found similar results in Boston when they studied the effects of block-level 
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variables on violence against police.  Results indicated that aggravated assaults against 
police officers are more common in block groups that have a high density of arrestees, 
as well as heightened levels of crime and violence. 
There have also been a few studies conducted on the associations between 
police assaults and specific types of calls for service.  Hirschel, Dean, and Lumb (1994), 
for example, studied the relationship between police assaults and consequent injuries 
and domestic violence in Charlotte, North Carolina.  Contrary to popular conjecture, 
domestic violence was not found to cause more injuries to officers than other calls, 
leading the authors to suggest that officer safety policies should focus on general safety 
rather than strategies related specifically to domestic violence.  Rabe-Hemp and Schuck 
(2007) found that domestic violence situations led to an increased risk of assault for 
female officers over that of their male counterparts, so it is possible that the gender of 
the officer has an effect on the situation that has not been found in prior studies of 
violence against officers and domestic violence. 
Another study was conducted on police safety and traffic stops, another situation 
commonly claimed to be very dangerous for police officers.  The researchers found that 
police deaths and assaults were rare when conducting traffic stops, and that traffic 
stops were not as dangerous as they had previously been deemed (Lichtenberg & 
Smith, 2001).  These results were relative to the frequency of traffic stops, which are 
one of the most frequent duties of police officers, and carried out by most officers on a 
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daily basis.  The actual number of officers assaulted while conducting traffic stops is still 




It is difficult to determine the factors that might make police officers less likely to 
suffer assaults, and it is even more difficult to do so with intentional deaths of police 
officers.  When dealing with police assaults, the officer’s perspective on the situation is 
available; when dealing with police deaths, investigators and researchers often must 
take their best guess at the particulars of the situation.  Sometimes the offender will talk 
about the incident if he or she was not also killed.  At other times, there is evidence from 
the officer’s in-car camera or body microphone, if available.  There may be statements 
from other officers, offenders, or witnesses, but often there is very little to go on when 
studying these situations.  There are, however, many more data collected on felonious 
police deaths than assaults in general, and consequently much more research has been 
conducted on police deaths than on police assaults. 
Most researchers agree that police deaths increased from about 1960 until the 
early 1970s, and then started a descent that continued at least through the mid-1990s 
(Batton & Wilson, 2006; Chapman, 1998; Quinet, Bordua, & Lassiter, 1997).  There are 
many suggested reasons for the decline, several of which probably worked together to 
lower the police homicide rate.  First and foremost is the adoption and technological 
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advancement of body armor, which has undoubtedly saved many officers’ lives.  Also, 
there have been numerous advances in police training, technology, and research on top 
of the fact that police behavior has been under much more scrutiny than in previous 
eras.  Also, advances in emergency medical treatment have probably played a role 
(Batton & Wilson, 2006; Harris, Thomas, Fischer, & Hirsch, 2002).  Trauma care for 
injuries such as gun and knife wounds and head blows is available much more quickly, 
leading to the increased likelihood of survival when faced with what would previously 
have been fatal injuries (Harris, et al., 2002). 
While rates of police homicide continue to generally decrease according to 
existing literature and FBI LEOKA data (see Figure 2), they are still unreasonably high.  
After continuing to decline since the early 1970s the number of deaths is still much 
higher than in 1960 when the low reached 28 (Chapman, 1998).  In 2008, the FBI 
reports that 41 officers were feloniously killed (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).  
Police officers continue to be intentionally killed more than any other occupational group 
except taxi drivers and chauffeurs (United States Postal Service Commission on a Safe 
and Secure Workplace, 2000 and Castillo & Jenkins, 1994).  From 1992-1997, police 





Figure 2: Felonious Deaths of Law Enforcement Officers (FBI Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2004-2008) 
 
To understand the dynamics involved in the killing of police officers, we turn to 
studies conducted by the FBI.  Killed in the Line of Duty (1992) was the first of the FBI’s 
three major studies on violence against law enforcement.  It focused specifically on 
officers who were murdered on duty.  The study examined in detail the cases of fifty-one 
incidents (which were not selected randomly) in which officers were slain and found 
similar results to the police assault cases studied.  Officers in the study were generally 
white males with a high school education.  The murdered officers were usually 
responding to disturbance calls in one-officer vehicles, and were most often killed with 
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male, and had no more than a high school education.   Most often, the offenders were 
using drugs and/or alcohol.   
Again, we should be aware that these incidents were not randomly selected, so 
caution must be used with any generalizations drawn from this study.  King and 
Sanders (1997) assert that the results of the FBI’s study are not supported by the 
national LEOKA data, which are also compiled by the FBI, because the non-random 
selection of cases for this study led to biased findings, namely in the representativeness 
of the “average” offender. 
The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) 
(2001) conducted a similar study using LEOKA data for the state of California (hereafter 
referred to as the California POST study).  The study found that of thirty-three officer 
slayings in California from 1995-1999, all of the officers were killed with guns 
(predominantly handguns), although there was a reported ten percent increase in the 
use of assault rifles against officers since the previous five-year report.  Most incidents 
occurred in urban and suburban areas during spring and summer.  The majority of the 
murders were on weekends, although there were cases spread across most weekdays.  
Most often the incidents occurred during the hours of darkness. 
Most of the slain officers in the California POST study were wearing body armor; 
of the seven officers who were not, three were off-duty at the time of the murders.  All of 
the officers except two who were off-duty were armed, and of these officers one-third 
were able to draw and fire their weapons and one officer was able to kill his murderer.  
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The officers’ fatal wounds were mostly to the head and chest, and most officers were 
shot only once.  In four cases, the specific bullets used defeated the officers’ issued 
body armor.  About half of the murdered officers were killed within one minute of their 
arrival on scene, and about two-thirds had either no back-up or only one additional 
officer present.  The majority of offenders in the California POST study were also alone, 
and about eighty-five percent of them had criminal records. 
Other studies have come to similar conclusions.  Chapman (1998) found that 
most officers who were murdered were responding to a disturbance, a robbery, or 
attempting arrest, and that handguns were the most common weapons used to kill 
officers.  Chapman also found that the weekends were more fatal to officers, but not by 
a large margin, and that half of the murders occurred between 6PM and 2AM, with the 
most deadly times between 10PM and midnight.  He also reports that female officers 
tend to die in the same circumstances as their male counterparts (Chapman, 1998). 
Fridell and Pate (2001) also found that the vast majority of officer murders were 
committed with handguns.  They report that about 16% of the officers were disarmed, 
and of these most were killed with their own weapons.  One-third of the murdered 
officers were wearing body armor but were killed anyway either because they were hit in 
another body location, their armor did not stop the particular type of bullets used, or the 
bullet circumvented the armor.  In cases of circumvention, the bullet usually went either 




As with police assaults in general, those assaults that result in officer deaths also 
appear to have a geographical dimension.  Kaminski, Jefferis, and Chanhatasilpa 
(2000) performed a cluster analysis on police deaths in the United States and found that 
while the South may not be the most dangerous place for officers in the United States, it 
is definitely among the top clusters when it comes to police deaths, along with large 
cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, DC.  The authors 
report that while the rate is very high in the South, police fatalities most often occur in 
metropolitan areas in general.  Kaminski (2008) also found that economic depression 
was a statistically significant predictor of police homicides when compared at the county 
level.   
In another study related to social conditions and violence against police, Jacobs 
and Carmichael (2002) examined large US cities (with population over 100,000) in 
relation to their risk factors for police.  They assert that danger factors include cities with 
higher divorce rates, higher rates of violent crime, and especially cities with larger 
disparities in resources available to whites and blacks (in general, areas of high social 
disorganization).  They report that police murders are higher in cities where blacks have 
less political influence.  For example, the deaths seem less prevalent in cities with black 
mayors, even if those cities have economic inequality between white and black citizens.  
However, Kaminski and Stucky (2009) found in a reanalysis of this study that there was 
no support for the black mayor hypothesis and that the finding may have been based on 
the specific model used.  After addressing methodological issues brought up in Jacobs’ 
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rebuttal (2010) and running additional analyses, Kaminski and Stucky (2010) still found 
that the black mayor hypothesis was not statistically robust.  Also, Kaminski (2008) 
found that there was no correlation between police murders and divorce rates as 
originally reported by Jacobs and Carmichael (2002). 
 While many studies have attempted to determine correlates of police violence, 
fewer have rigorously examined social factors that might affect the rates of police 
homicide.  A notable exception, Kaminski and Marvell (2002) found in a longitudinal 
study of felonious deaths of officers that many factors assumed to affect the number of 
police deaths do not have a statistically significant effect.  These include changes in the 
crack epidemic, executions, access to firearms, and emergency medical care (although 
the authors warn that more valid measures of emergency care are needed).  The 
authors found that the factors which affect the police homicide rate are generally the 
same as those which affect the overall homicide rate, such as the condition of the 
economy.  However, these factors seem to affect police homicides to a larger extent.  
Another study, conducted by Mustard (2001), examined the impact of gun laws on 
police deaths and reported that concealed weapons permits and gun purchase waiting 
periods did in fact lower police deaths, although only slightly. 
The studies reviewed above represent a growing body of research about 
individual and social factors which correlate with police violence or which affect these 
situations as they are occurring; however, there is relatively little knowledge about why 
police violence occurs.  Can violence against the police be explained in the same ways 
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as violence in general?  Do incidents of violence against the police have different 
causes or characteristics than general violent incidents?  Violence against officers may 
be undertaken in an attempt to prevent arrest or in efforts to resist the current social 
control system, reasoning that obviously would not apply in the average case of a 
simple assault and battery.  This underscores the importance of developing a theoretical 
framework to explain police violence, something only a few studies have attempted to 
this point. 
 
Explaining Police Violence 
 
Some studies of the correlates of police violence have indirectly tested 
explanations of resistance to, and assaults of, police officers.  For example, some prior 
studies have tested political or conflict-related factors (i.e. Belvedere, Worrall, & Gibbs, 
2005; Engel, 2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2002; Kaminski & Stucky, 2009) and others 
have examined variables that may align with subcultural explanations (i.e. Kaminski, 
Jefferis, & Chanhatasilpa, 2000).  Most studies conducted on police violence to this 
point have focused only on limited theoretical factors if any, seriously limiting the 
explanatory power of current literature on this topic.  Violence against police officers is a 
quite complicated matter, and only a thorough theoretical perspective that takes into 




Kaminski (2002) provides one such example of a more holistic explanation of 
police violence in his use of routine activities theory.  Developed by Cohen and Felson 
(1979), routine activities theory specifies that crime occurs upon the intersection of a 
suitable target, a motivated offender, and a lack of capable guardianship.  Rather than 
focusing only on the offender, as many criminological theories of the past, routine 
activities theory was revolutionary in that it forced the consideration of victim and 
situational characteristics as well.   
The concept of the motivated offender may not apply to police assaults in the 
traditional sense because most police assaults are unplanned attempts to escape 
arrest; in cases of violence against police officers it is more likely that the offender 
becomes motivated after the encounter between officer and offender has begun.  
Kaminski (2002) argues that police officers may make suitable targets if an offender is 
motivated by his or her wrongdoing and the knowledge that s/he will go to jail or prison if 
caught.  Guardianship for police officers may theoretically be provided by firearms, body 
armor, and the like, although in Kaminski’s 2002 study these factors were not found to 
reduce police murders.  These variables and others affecting the proximity of targets to 
offenders, geographically speaking, and the exposure of the officer targets to said 
offenders may help to explain officer murders.   
Fridell, Faggiani, Taylor, Brito, and Kubu (2009) also use routine activities theory 
to explain police violence and build on Kaminski’s (2002) work by examining agency-
level variables for their possible significance to police violence.  Using data from the 
24 
 
National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the authors studied three years of 
assaults and killings of police officers in the US.  They found statistically significant 
relationships between police violence and the agency body armor policies (i.e. agencies 
that required the use of body armor by officers experienced fewer police assaults), the 
level of accountability taken by agencies as evidenced by the highest level of supervisor 
who reviewed use of force reports, and the violent crime rate in the area.  These are all 
factors that can be explained using the concepts that routine activities theory 
encompasses.  Requiring the use of body armor by an agency affects the level of 
guardianship, as does the level of accountability assumed by the agency, and an area’s 
violent crime rate affects the proximity of suitable targets—in this case, police officers— 
to motivated offenders, who are generally more plentiful in areas with higher crime 
rates. 
The works of Kaminski (2002) and of Fridell et al. (2009) represent a broader 
theoretical approach to explain violence against police that is necessary to encompass 
all relevant explanatory factors.  Unfortunately, these studies stand alone in the use of 
this more comprehensive approach to studying violence against police, and while 
routine activities theory may be able to explain how and under what circumstances 
police assaults occur, the current study is focused on why these assaults occur, a task 
for which the criminal events perspective is more appropriate. 
The criminal events perspective, which is similar to routine activities theory in that 
it considers multiple facets of crime occurrence rather than solely the offender, is the 
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theoretical framework which was employed in the current study.  This theoretical 
perspective originally grew out of Luckenbill’s (1977) idea of homicide as a situated 
transaction in which the victim and offender act, in turn, based on their perception of the 
other’s stance.  Luckenbill describes a six-stage process in which victim and offender 
interact in a designated order, all of which are situated in a specific social situation.  
Stage one occurs when the victim performs some act which the offender perceives as 
being offensive toward him/herself, whether the victim intended this act to be offensive 
or not.  This interpretation of the victim’s act as offensive comprises stage two of the 
process, and in stage three the offender chooses a response to this perceived offense, 
either in the form of excusing the behavior, retreating from the interaction, or retaliating.  
In Luckenbill’s cases of murder, and presumably in the cases of all types of violent 
crime, the offender chooses the third option.  In stage four, the victim now makes his or 
her choice, either to challenge the offender, to apologize, or to retreat from the situation.  
If the victim chooses to stand up to the offender, the transaction moves on to stage five, 
in which both victim and offender have stood up to each other and cannot back down 
without losing face, so they “commit to battle,” which one of the actors in the transaction 
inevitably loses.  Finally, in stage six, the offender again makes a decision, this time 
either to retreat from the scene or to wait on scene for the arrival of police officers; 
conversely, the offender may be forced to wait for the arrival of police officers by others 
at the scene.  This, according to Luckenbill, marks the end of the situated transaction.  
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The criminal events perspective, as developed by Sacco and Kennedy (2002), 
grew from this idea of the situated transaction, and was designed to encompass not 
only the situation of the offender, but also that of the victim and of the social 
circumstances surrounding a criminal incident.  Sacco and Kennedy assert that criminal 
events, like other social phenomena, have a beginning, middle, and end—each event 
has precursors, the actual transaction, and the aftermath of the transaction, which are 
all affected by the social situation, the environment, and the perspectives of all those 
involved in the event.  Precursors to an event are the factors that bring the involved 
parties together in time and space.  The transaction itself (i.e. when the actual event 
occurs) may involve any number of factors defined by the characteristics of the 
particular situation, such as whether the event occurs in a crowded parking lot or an 
isolated alley, whether one or all of the participants have been drinking alcohol or 
consuming other mind-altering substances, etc.  Finally, the aftermath of the event 
might include reactions of the actors, witnesses of the event, police officers, and the 
community at large, as well as the effects of the crime on any victims and the attitudes 
and feelings of any offenders toward the event. 
Rather than focusing solely on the offender who wishes to commit a crime, the 
criminal events perspective places the offender as one of several important facets of the 
situation.  The victim, bystanders, police officers, where and when the crime occurs, and 
the social and physical environments are also acknowledged as playing a role.  As 
Sacco and Kennedy (2002) point out, the fact that an offender wishes to commit a crime 
27 
 
does not necessarily mean that a crime will occur.  For a crime to take place, the 
opportunity to commit the crime must arise, and this is where the other factors come 
into play.  
While the criminal events perspective has never been applied to violence against 
police officers, there have been empirical tests of the theory based on other types of 
violent crime.  Sherley (2005) used the criminal events perspective to study sexual 
assaults through the use of police case files.  This allowed for a more thorough 
examination of the incidents in which the author could consider the unique 
circumstances of each actor.  She consequently discovered that importance lay not only 
in the intersection of the victim, offender, and lack of guardianship, but also with the 
dynamics of these interactions and the relative importance of each actor. 
Another study which utilized the criminal events perspective to study violent 
crime was conducted by Weaver et al. (2004).  Based on NIBRS data, this study 
examined factors from six categories comprising the idea of the criminal event in an 
effort to understand what factors affect the lethality of interpersonal violent crime.  The 
study found the criminal events perspective to be an effective tool for understanding the 
correlates of lethality as variables all facets of the criminal event were determined to 
affect lethality, with the circumstance of the assault and the weapon used found to make 
the strongest difference. 
The criminal events perspective has never been used to study police violence, 
but there is reason to believe that it would be useful in doing so.  Routine activities 
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theory has been successfully used to study police violence in the past (Fridell et al., 
2009; Kaminski, 2002), and the criminal events perspective may be viewed as an 
extension and/or broadening of routine activities theory.  Some comparisons may also 
be drawn between factors that affect violence against the police and violence in general, 
but the effects are still ambiguous.  Using data from the National Law Enforcement 
Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), Kaminski and Marvell (2002) found that while some 
of the same factors (such as economic growth and decline) affect both police homicides 
and general homicides, they are affected at much different rates with police homicide 
trends being influenced much more than general homicide trends.   
As noted above, the criminal events perspective places emphasis on how actors 
and circumstances come together in space and time to lead to the commission of a 
crime; where and when incidents occur is an important part of understanding why 
incidents occur.  The social environment in which actors are situated is of high 
importance in determining how an event will unfold, so any study hoping to uncover 
causes of police violence must consider the characteristics of the neighborhoods in 
which these incidents are common, something that can be accomplished through 
looking at an area’s level of social disorganization. 
 Theories of social disorganization have flourished in recent years, and for good 
reason: many types of crime can be explained by the characteristics of the geographical 
area in which the crime occurred.  Since the early days of the Chicago School and the 
groundbreaking works of Park and Burgess (1925) and Shaw and McKay (1942), social 
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disorganization theory has been tested time and again.  The basic logic behind this 
perspective is that residents of a community normally exert social control in the public 
spaces in their area in order to maintain a safe neighborhood.  When these informal 
social control networks break down, the community loses its control over the area, and 
crime, or originally, delinquency occurs (Shaw & McKay, 1942).  When neighbors stop 
investing in their community by getting to know each other and maintaining a support 
network together, citizens can quickly lose the feelings of comfort and safety that they 
once enjoyed.  Soon indicators of social disorganization arise, including high poverty 
levels, high population turnover, high population heterogeneity (Shaw & McKay, 1942), 
and an increase in female-headed households (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993).  When 
indicators of social disorganization arise within a community, increases in crime 
generally follow. 
  Social disorganization theory has undergone considerable empirical testing in 
recent years and the perspective has gained a substantial amount of support.  Several 
studies have demonstrated that crime incidents, offender locations, and attitudes about 
crime vary by geographical area and that crime is often concentrated in certain 
neighborhoods, usually where there is less informal social control (for example, see 
Button, 2008; Martinez, Rosenfeld, & Mares, 2008; Mustaine, Tewksbury, & Stengel, 
2006).  When a neighborhood has less informal social control over its public spaces, 
more crime occurs (Sampson & Groves, 1989).  This increase in crime inevitably leads 
to a higher police presence, which leads to more interactions between citizens and 
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police officers in areas where a higher proportion of citizens may be involved in criminal 
activity and do not wish to have a higher level of contact with the police.  This can lead 
to further hostility between the police and citizens in the neighborhood.  In these high-
crime areas where animosity towards police as well as formal authority in general is 
bred, the environment is naturally ripe for more violence to occur between police and 
citizens in that area; the police and potential attackers are often in close proximity to 
one another and there are more subjects in these neighborhoods who are motivated to 
avoid arrest by whatever means necessary.  Therefore, socially disorganized areas are 
likely to experience more cases of violence against the police than socially organized 
neighborhoods. 
 While these links between social disorganization and police violence have not 
been studied extensively, there have been significant relationships found between some 
social disorganization factors and the murder of police officers.  Poverty (Chamlin, 
1989), unemployment (Bailey, 1982; Bailey & Peterson, 1987), and divorce (Chamlin, 
1989; Peterson & Bailey, 1988) have all been found to influence the odds of police 
murder to some extent.  It follows that these factors may be important indicators of 







Importance of the Current Study 
 
 Police violence is a difficult phenomenon to study because it is impossible to 
ascertain the rate of prevention afforded by police actions and behaviors—there are 
undoubtedly countless times when an officer does something that prevents an assault 
on him or herself or others and never knows it—after all, officers are trained to keep 
violence to a minimum whenever possible.  While the body of research connecting 
certain individual and social factors with police violence is growing, much more work is 
needed as the body of previous research has, on the whole, suffered from some serious 
deficiencies. 
One of the main problems with studying violence against the police is the 
availability and quality of data sources.  The majority of studies thus far have relied on 
official sources of data such as the FBI’s LEOKA dataset or NIBRS.  These data 
sources are quite valuable in that they represent a broad set of cases from across the 
US.  However, they only provide limited types of information which have often been 
funneled not only through the officers and then their agencies, but through an additional 
federal government agency as well.  Few studies (e.g. Bazley, Lersch, & Mieczkowski 
2007; Fridell et al., 2009; Kaminski, Edwards, & Johnson, 1998) have relied on data 
collected directly from police agencies, and although the data may be restricted to only 
one geographical area, they may be more detailed or provide different types of 
information than that available from nationwide sources, allowing researchers to study 
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more varied facets of officer assaults.  The current study employed data collected 
directly by the Orlando Police Department (OPD) for their own use.  The data included 
many variables of cases of violence against officers which would not be available from 
any other source.  
Another major problem with prior research on violence against officers is that the 
majority of studies have examined only those cases of police assault which have ended 
with the officer’s death.  Minor assaults and those that result in minor injuries have been 
largely ignored in existing literature although they are— thankfully— much more 
common and it costs police agencies vast amounts of resources to handle these 
incidents.  Aside from the emotional costs to the officers themselves, agencies lose 
resources on several other factors such as lost work time due to officer injuries, lost 
work time for officers and their supervisors due to extra paperwork for the incident, 
medical care for officers, and counseling for officers who have been assaulted.  The 
current study considered all reported batteries against Orlando Police Department 
officers within a three-year period to facilitate learning about these more common minor 
incidents. 
A third and final problem with existing research is the lack of a consistent and 
comprehensive theoretical background with which to frame the study of these incidents.  
The current study will be the first to consider victim, offender, and incident 
characteristics of the police assault as a criminal event.  The use of the criminal events 
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perspective along with social disorganization theory allows for the study of police 
violence in a more comprehensive way than has previously been possible. 
 
Research Questions  
 
Based on findings from the above prior studies and the current study’s theoretical 
framework, the following five research questions are advanced.  Specific hypotheses of 
the current study will be linked to each research question in the discussion of research 
methods below in Chapter Three. 
1. When are officer batteries most likely to occur?   
 Exact times are not agreed upon, but prior research does indicate that 
hours of darkness are generally most dangerous for officers (Brandl, 
1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2006; Meyer, et al., 1981).  A compilation of the most 
dangerous hours in these studies suggests that a timeframe of about 
9:00 PM to 3:00 AM would be appropriate for analysis, especially 
considering that many bars close for business at 2:00 AM. 
 According to a California Police Officer Standards and Training study 
(2001), a study conducted by Chapman (1998), and the work of Meyer, 
et al. (1981), weekends are more dangerous to police officers than 
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weekdays.  This may especially be true in the downtown bar district 
and the tourist areas of the city where weekends often bring larger 
crowds and increased alcohol consumption. 
 The work of Meyer, et al. (1981) indicates that police assaults are most 
likely to occur during warmer, summer months.  Uniform Crime Report 
(UCR) data indicate that summer months are the most dangerous time 
of year in general as well (FBI, 2004).  Summer is also a high tourist 
season in Orlando, when there is ample alcohol consumption and 
crowds, leading to increased chances of disturbances of all types. 
2. What types of calls are most likely to lead to officer battery?   
 Based on previous research, calls of a disturbance nature will more 
often lead to officer battery and/or injury (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 1997), as will cases stemming from violent offenses, 
cases with multiple officers involved (Garner & Maxwell, 2002), and 
cases with multiple offenders involved (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). 
Furthermore, police injury will be more likely in cases in which personal 
weapons are used by the offender (Kaminski & Sorensen, 1995), and 
police battery will be more likely when no intermediate weapons (such 
as oleoresin capsicum spray and/or Tasers) were used by the officer 
(Kaminski, Edwards, & Johnson,1998; Smith, et al., 2007). 
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3. What demographic characteristics of offenders most often lead to battery on 
an officer in a use of force situation?   
 According to extant research, we expect that offenders who batter 
officers will be most often young, non-white (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2007), and female (Engel, 2003).  We also expect 
offenders of larger size and offenders with altered mental states (i.e. 
perceived mental illness or intoxication) to batter officers more often 
than other offenders (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Meyer, et 
al., 1981; Stetzer, 2001).   
4. What demographic characteristics of officers are more likely to lead to 
battery?   
 Prior studies would lead us to expect that young officers, white officers, 
and male officers will suffer battery most often (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1992). 
5. In which areas of the City of Orlando is officer battery more prominent? 
 Incidents of officer battery are most likely to occur in areas of high 
social disorganization because of a general attitude of disrespect for 
formal law enforcement that is more predominant in these areas.  
Officer batteries are also more likely to occur in areas where there are 
large crowds of people together along with large amounts of alcohol 
consumption because the combination of crowding and alcohol use is 
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likely to lead to disturbances and fights.  In Orlando, the areas of high 
alcohol use would be the bar area of the downtown business district 




CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
 
 The goals of the current study are twofold: (1) the study tests for empirical 
support of the criminal events perspective as an explanation of violence against police, 
and (2) the study determines factors which contribute to the likelihood of batteries 
against police officers.  As noted above, the variables tested can be divided into three 
broad categories: situational or structural characteristics, offender characteristics, and 
officer characteristics.  The criminal events perspective as a framework for studying 
violence against police is supported if at least one variable in all three categories is a 
statistically significant predictor of police violence.  These findings would indicate that 
viewing police battery as an event with a beginning, middle, and end and taking into 
account the entire social situation revolving around such incidents are necessary 




 Data used in the current study are from the Orlando Police Department (OPD), 
the municipal police agency of Orlando, Florida.  OPD employs over 700 certified law 
enforcement officers in patrol capacities throughout the city of Orlando, including patrol 
vehicles, foot officers, horseback officers, and bicycle officers (City of Orlando, 2005).  
OPD serves metropolitan Orlando, which has a population of 250,000 year-round city 
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residents.  The greater Orlando area has over two million year-round residents (US 
Census Bureau, 2007) and is the fourth largest metropolis in the southeastern United 
States (City of Orlando, 2009).    The metro Orlando area is a major tourist destination 
which attracted 48.7 million visitors in 2007 alone (Orlando/Orange County Convention 
and Visitors Bureau, 2009), providing challenges for law enforcement that most areas 
do not face.  Besides being responsible for a large metropolitan city with the crime 
problems that usually accompany growth, OPD must contend with the constant influx of 
visitors who are generally unknown to the department and who create unique 
challenges due to the heavy population density in popular tourist areas, especially the 
overcrowded downtown bars and nightclubs and other places where both locals and 
tourists gather en masse and where alcohol use is prevalent.  These factors make 
Orlando an unusually interesting city in which to study crime.  
 The current study utilized data of Orlando Police Department (see Appendix A) 
that were collected internally by OPD for the agency’s own use.  OPD collects 
information on every reported incident in which force is used by any of the agency’s 
police officers.  Every reported use of force is recorded on these forms regardless of 
whether the incident resulted in injury to any party or even the eventual arrest of the 
subject on which force was used.  For the purposes of the data collection, use of force 
may have involved the deployment of weapons by officers, but also simply the use of 
hands or bodies to control a suspect.  The forms include: the time, date, and location of 
the incident (some incidents occurred outside city limits but involved City of Orlando 
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police officers), the original reason for the incident or call, any offenses for which the 
subject of the force was later charged, counts and demographic information on all 
offenders, OPD employees, and any known witnesses, information on all weapons 
used, a narrative of the incident written by the principal officer’s supervisor, and whether 
or not the use of force was cleared by supervisors as appropriate and within agency 
guidelines.  Also included is the number of OPD officers who were battered and/or 
injured from the incident, if any2.  It is important to note that in Florida, there is a legal 
distinction drawn between assaults, which can be verbal or involve the threat (but not 
actual use) of physical violence, and batteries, in which actual physical contact takes 
place.  The OPD use of force forms indicate the number of officers battered.  This 
allowed for a comparison between cases in which no officers were battered and cases 
that led to the physical battery of at least one officer. 
 The use of force forms were provided for use in the current study although they 
contain sensitive information that is not available to the public.  For this reason, the 
study proposal was thoroughly reviewed and approved by the University of Central 
Florida’s Institutional Review Board (see Appendix C).  The files available represent 
three years of data from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2008.  However, the 
file for March 2008 could not be located at the time of data collection; therefore, the 
entire dataset represents a total of 35 months of cases rather than 36.  All incidents 
reported will be included in the current study, so no sampling procedure will be required.  
                                            
2
 A copy of the Orlando Police Department’s use of force policy, including the described form, can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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The complete dataset contains 1,812 cases in which force was used by one or more 
officers for the three year total.  This includes 391 cases in which a total of 457 officers 
were battered and 173 cases in which 216 officers were injured.  All case information 
was taken from hard copies of the forms and put directly into an SPSS database for 
analysis. 
 It is important for our evolving knowledge of violence against the police to use 
different forms of data than the traditional official reports to the Uniform Crime Reporting 
system, and the current study assisted in this growth.  However, as with any dataset, 
there were potential threats to validity and reliability that should be considered 
throughout the study methodology and subsequent interpretation of results.  First, the 
information on the use of force forms was reported by the principally-involved officer’s 
direct supervisor.  As with any time that data are reported by several different people, 
there may have been conflicts in the way the data are reported.  For example, the form 
asks for all physical tactics used by officers during the incident; some supervisors 
interpret this as weapons other than body parts, some include hands, knees, etc. only if 
they were used to strike, and some supervisors include any instance that an officer laid 
hands on a suspect, even if it were only to apply handcuffs.  Therefore, in the current 
study, only intermediate weapons (i.e. Tasers) were tested for significance.  Personal 
weapons (i.e. body parts) were not tested due to the ambiguity in the data. 
 Another methodological issue that should be considered relates to the reporting 
of injuries to officers.  While some supervisors reported even the most minor of injuries, 
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others may have reported only more serious injuries.  Furthermore, the traditional 
bravado associated with police officers may have led some officers not to report minor 
injuries, such as small scrapes or muscle soreness, at all.  This undoubtedly led to an 
underreporting of officer injuries, although the extent of this problem is unknown.  
However, unreported injuries were almost certainly minor; we can be assured that any 
moderate or serious injury would generally have to be reported either because medical 
treatment was required or because there was blood-to-blood contact between the 
offender and the officer which had to be addressed for officer safety reasons. 
 A third methodological concern lies in the reporting of the races of the offenders 
and officers.  Most supervisors reported race as either black, white, Hispanic, Asian, or 
other.  Very few reports included whether an actor was white or black and whether he or 
she was Hispanic.  Therefore, for purposes of uniformity in the data and their analysis, 
race in the dataset was reported simply as white, black, Hispanic, or other3; there was 
no separate distinction between white or black non-Latinos and white or black Latinos. 
 The fourth and final methodological issue to be aware of is temporal.  Police-
citizen interactions are complex and involve a large amount of perception on both sides.  
In some cases, offense may have been taken by the officer first, while in other cases 
offense might have been taken by the offender first.  While all of these cases involved 
force by the police and some involved violence by the suspect, there was no reliable 
method to determine how the incident actually started, or more importantly which actor 
                                            
3
 Asians were included in the other category because there were too few Asian officers and suspects to 
form a separate category. 
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made the first move.  The reader should be aware that because of data limitations, the 




Phase One: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 After testing for outliers, multicollinearity issues, and high levels of correlation 
between potential variables, three phases of analysis were conducted4.  Phase one 
included an examination of the data collected on the incidences of violence against 
Orlando officers.  Because these data had never been previously studied, they were 
first examined thoroughly through the use of descriptive statistics to fully understand the 
characteristics therein.  This helped promote understanding of the general trends in the 
data and ensured that the data were clean for further analysis.   
 
Phase Two: Logistic Regression 
 
 Phase two of the analysis employed inferential statistics to examine possible 
connections between officer battery and personal characteristics of the victims and 
                                            
4
 There were no multicollinearity problems detected and no variables were highly correlated. 
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offenders as well as situational characteristics.  This phase utilized logistic regression5  
in order to determine the statistical significance of several different factors related to 
police violence.  Three models were employed during this phase of analysis.  The first 
model included situational independent variables only, the second model added in 
offender characteristics, and the third model tested officer characteristics in addition to 
the variables of the first two models.  The dependent variable for all three models was a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not a use of force incident led to a battery on one 
or more officers (where 0= use of force with no officer battery and 1= use of force with 
officer battery). 
 The independent variables for the first logistic regression model tested the 
relevance of situational factors for each incident.  Independent variables included Taser 
use, time of day, season, the nature of the original call or officer-initiated contact, 
whether or not there were single or multiple officers and offenders on scene, and the 
number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol within a ½ mile radius of the incident 
location.  Model Two added in variables to test characteristics of the primary offender, 
including race, age, gender, size/body composition (measured by BMI), and whether or 
not the offender was known to have recently consumed alcohol before the incident.  The 
third and final model added in characteristics of the primary officer, including race, age, 
and gender. 
                                            
5




 The logistic regression models were designed to test several hypotheses that 
were directly related to the first four of the five research questions listed above. 
1. When were officer batteries most likely to occur?   
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur between 9:00 PM and 
3:00 AM. 
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur on Friday, Saturday, and 
Sunday. 
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur during June, July, and 
August. 
2. What types of calls were most likely to lead to officer battery?   
a. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when Tasers were used. 
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the original reason 
for the officer/suspect interaction was a violent crime (i.e. involved 
assault and/or battery, attempted murder, etc). 
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when multiple officers 
were on scene. 
d. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when multiple offenders 
were on scene. 
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e. Officer batteries were more likely to occur in areas within ½ mile of 
a large number of businesses that are licensed to sell alcohol6. 
3. What demographic characteristics of offenders most often led to battery on an 
officer in a use of force situation?   
a. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when the suspect was 
white. 
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect was 
young. 
c. Officer batteries were less likely to occur when the suspect was 
male. 
d. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect had a 
higher BMI. 
e. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the suspect was 
known to have recently consumed alcohol. 
4. What demographic characteristics of officers were more likely to lead to 
battery?   
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur when the officer was 
white. 
b. Officer batteries were more likely to occur to younger officers. 
c. Officer batteries were more likely to occur to male officers. 
                                            
6
 The number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol within ½ mile was derived from a ½ mile buffer 
around all incidents created in ArcGIS. 
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Phase Three: Spatial Analyses 
 
 The third phase of analysis employed crime analysis techniques through the use 
of two geographic mapping and analysis software programs: ESRI’s ArcGIS suite 
(ESRI, 2008) and NIJ’s CrimeStat program, which is a statistics program that aids in the 
analysis of crime locations (Ned Levine and Associates, 2009).  Phase Three was 
designed to examine the geographical characteristics of the incidents as compared to 
areas of social disorganization and alcohol use; this provided a test of the importance of 
space and time to the occurrence of police battery.  First, maps were created to visually 
examine the locations of use of force incidents in general and use of force incidents that 
resulted in officer batteries.  The base map layer of Orlando streets was obtained from 
ESRI’s website (www. esri.com), where current map layers of Orlando city limits, 
streets, and neighborhoods are available for public use.  Using this source ensured that 
the street layer was as up to date as possible.  Census tract layers were obtained from 
the US Census Bureau website.  All other map layers, which contained information 
about the battery incidents against officers, were created by the author directly from the 
OPD data. 
 Next, spatial analyses were conducted to determine whether there were 
statistically significant clusters of any of the above types of incidents.  Because each 
type of spatial analysis tests for connections in different ways, it was crucial to use more 
than one type of analysis.  Using multiple analyses to test for clusters allows for the 
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testing of both point and aggregate data, and the analyses vary in statistical robustness.  
If a simple analysis is run with positive results, there is impetus to run more advanced 
analyses. 
 In the current study, three analyses were run to test for spatial clustering.  First, a 
chloropleth map7 of officer batteries by count was created to visually test for incident 
clustering at the census tract level.  Second, two nearest neighbor analyses were run.  
The nearest neighbor analysis tests for statistically significant clustering and returns an 
index value which tells the researcher whether clustering exists and the strength of the 
clustering.  The single-order nearest neighbor index is a measure of how close,  
geographically, each incident is to the next closest incident; the k-order nearest 
neighbor index is a measure of how close each incident is to the next closest incident, 
then the next and the next to the kth incident.  The index value returned states whether 
or not the incidents are closer than what would have been expected to occur by chance 
(Paulsen & Robinson, 2009). 
 The nearest neighbor analysis is a robust test of clustering, but does not describe 
where the clustering occurred.  Therefore, a third spatial analysis was run—a quartic 
kernel density interpolation.  Kernel density interpolation places a fine grid over the 
entire study area, then measures the distance from the center of each grid square to the 
incident locations (Paynich & Hill, 2010).  This provides a continuous layer over the 
                                            
7
 Chloropleth maps use varied colors to indicate intensity of a variable in each area under study.  In this 
case, for example, each census tract was shaded so that darker tracts indicated a higher number of 
incidents occurring in that tract. 
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study area that indicates clustering or lack of clustering in all areas.  The quartic type of 
interpolation was chosen because it is the most appropriate for mapping crime incident 
locations (Eck, Chainey, Cameron, Leitner, & Wilson, 2005).  This is because crime 
locations are not continuous—in other words, no incidents occur “between” incidents. 
 Upon determining the extent and location of officer battery clusters, analyses 
were conducted in attempts to explore why there were clusters in these areas.  To test 
for a relationship with social disorganization factors, a social disorganization scale was 
created using data from the US Census Bureau’s 2000 data collection8.  Six social 
disorganization variables were considered, including: population heterogeneity 
(measured by % white), education level (measured by the percentage of the population 
age 25 and older who received less than a high school education), unemployment 
levels (measured by the percentage of the population age 16 and older who were 
unemployed), poverty level (measured by the percentage of households on public 
assistance and the percentage of families whose income was below the poverty level), 
housing stability/mobility (measured by the percentage of renter-occupied housing units 
and the percentage of vacant housing units), and family composition (measured by the 
percentage of female-headed households). 
 A scale was developed to measure social disorganization by census tract, and 
each tract was assigned a score from zero to six which indicated the number of social 
                                            
8
 The 2000 Census was the most recent source for obtaining all of the data needed at the tract level 
rather than the city level.  A comparison between 2000 Census data for Orlando City and 2006-2008 3-
year estimates from the American Communities Survey for Orlando City did indicate some changes over 
the past few years, although most were minor. For more information on the estimated differences 
between the 2000 and 2006-2008 data, see Appendix D. 
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disorganization variables for which the tract was above average; higher scores indicated 
higher levels of disorganization.  A chloropleth map was then created of social 
disorganization levels by census tract that could be compared to officer battery counts 
by census tract.  This allowed for an investigation of the potential linkages between 
areas with high levels of officer violence and areas with high levels of social 
disorganization. 
 Another exploration into why officer batteries were more prevalent in certain 
areas revolved around alcohol use and crowding situations.  A list of all current 
businesses in Orlando that hold licenses to sell alcohol was obtained from the State of 
Florida’s Department of Business and Professional Regulation.  These locations were 
mapped and compared to the clusters of officer battery incidents to determine the extent 
of overlap.  Furthermore, alcohol license locations were also mapped by type (on 
premises consumption such as bars and clubs vs. off premises consumption such as 
liquor stores) to examine any differences therein. 
 These spatial analyses were designed specifically to test hypotheses related to 
the fifth research question: 
5. In which areas of the city of Orlando was officer battery more prominent? 
a. Officer batteries were more likely to occur in areas of high social 
disorganization. 




The first step in determining the characteristics and causes of officer battery in 
Orlando, as described above, was to examine the data set in detail.  In Chapter Four: 
Descriptive Statistics, the frequency and characteristics of officer battery incidents are 
discussed.  The regression analyses that comprise the second phase of analysis are 
discussed in Chapter Five: Regression Analyses, and in Chapter Six: Spatial Analyses, 





CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 The first stage of analysis involved using descriptive statistics to examine the 
data in detail.  Between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008, there were 1,812 
reported use of force incidents by police in the city of Orlando.  Of those 1,812 
incidents, 391 (21.58%) involved battery against at least one law enforcement officer 
employed by Orlando Police Department, and 173 cases (9.54%) involved the injury of 
at least one OPD officer.  Six-hundred twenty-eight use of force cases occurred in 2006, 
629 occurred in 2007, and 554 occurred in 2008 (although, as noted above, the file for 
the March 2008 cases could not be located at the time of data collection).  There was 
no significant difference in the frequency of incidents by year.  Of the incidents involving 
battery against an officer or officers, 140 occurred in 2006, 153 occurred in 2007, and 
98 occurred in 2008.  Twenty-four officer battery cases occurred in January, 34 
occurred in February, 28 occurred in March, 40 occurred in April, 36 occurred in May, 
38 occurred in June, 25 occurred in July, 32 occurred in August, 32 occurred in 
September, 38 occurred in October, 31 occurred in November, and 33 occurred in 
December.  There appeared to be little difference by seasonality, which is logical 
because the semi-tropical climate in Orlando does not allow for the defined seasons 
that are found in other areas of the country.  For a further breakdown of year and month 




Figure 3: Officer Battery by Month and Year 






















In 27 cases, battery against an officer or officers occurred on a Monday, 45 
cases occurred on Tuesdays, 50 occurred on Wednesdays, 47 occurred on Thursdays, 
60 occurred on Fridays, 79 occurred on Saturdays, and 83 cases occurred on Sundays 
(see Figure 4).  Although prior research has not found a significant pattern of officer 
assault by day of the week, this is consistent with FBI reports (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2009) indicating that the murder of police officers occurs most frequently 
during the weekend days.  As for the time of day in which the incidents occurred, thirty-
one cases occurred during the earlier part of the day, from 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM.  Eighty-
two cases occurred from 3:00 PM through 9:00 PM, 235 cases occurred between 9:00 
PM and 3:00 AM, and 43 cases occurred between 3:00 AM and 9:00 AM (see Figure 5).  
While prior studies have not reached a consensus on the specific times that are most 
dangerous to officers, this finding is consistent in that the most dangerous times in 
general are times of darkness (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997; 




 The 391 battery incidents involved 620 individual officer victims.  The victims 
were overwhelmingly male (563 male victims, or 91%) (see Figure 6), to a slightly larger 




Figure 4: Officer Battery by Day of Week 

























female.  The victim officers were predominantly white (72%), while 16% were black, 6% 
were Hispanic, 1% were Asian, and 2% were of other races.  In 17 instances (3%), race 
information was missing (see Figure 7).   
As compared to the general officer population, it appears that white officers are 
overrepresented among those battered, while Hispanic officers are underrepresented.  
Sixty-two percent of the total officer population at OPD is white, 18% is black, 16% is 
Hispanic, 3% is Asian, and about 1% if comprised of other ethnicities.  About 8% of 
officers were age 25 or younger (n=50), while 44% were between 26 and 34 years of 
age (n=269), 44% were between 35 and 49 years of age (n=270), 2% were between 50 
and 64 years of age (n=14), and 3% were age 65 or older (n=17) (see Figure 8).  Officer 
ages ranged from 22 to 56 years at the time of the battery incident, with an average 
officer age of about 34.4 years. The officer demographic information was in general 




In the 391 battery incidents, there were 425 individual offenders.  The offenders 
were also predominantly male (85%), but not to the same extent as the victims (Figure 
6).  Racial makeup of the offenders was strikingly different than that of the victims, with 
43% white, 43% black, 11% Hispanic, and 1% each of Asian and of other descent (4 
offenders, or about 1%, were missing race information) (Figure 7).  This is generally in 
56 
 
line with the previously discussed prior studies in the area.  Offenders were also 
younger than victim officers on the whole, with 6% age 17 or younger, 38% between 18 
and 25 years of age, 30% between 26 and 34 years of age, 18% between 35 and 49, 
4% between 50 and 64, and 1% age 65 or older (16 offenders, or 4%, were missing this 
information).  Offenders were over five years younger than officers on the whole, with a 
range spanning 65 years (from 10 years to 75 years old) (Figure 8) and an average of 
about 28.9 years.  Of course, some of this difference in age between victim and 
offender may occur because officers must be at least 21 years of age before being 
employed in law enforcement while there is no minimum age for offenders.  The heights 
of offenders ranged from 4 feet and 4 inches to 6 feet and 5 inches with an average of 
about 5 feet 9 inches.  Offender weights ranged from 90 pounds to 390 pounds with an 
average of about 181 pounds.  
 Offenders were not only from the state of Florida, but also many other states in 
the US as well as outside the US.  Of the 425 offenders, 339 resided in Florida, 30 lived 
elsewhere in the US, and 1 was visiting from a foreign country.  Another 28 offenders 
were transient, and for 27 offenders the residence was unknown, usually because the 
offender refused to answer or in a few cases because the offender had fled and not 
been found at the time of the report.  For a breakdown of the counties in which the 









































Figure 8: Age of Officers and Suspects 
NOTE: Citizens are not eligible to be employed as law enforcement officers until the age 
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 At the time of the incidents, several suspects were known to have altered mental 
conditions or prior injuries of some sort.  The most common type of altered condition by 
far was alcohol use.  One-hundred ninety offenders (45%) were known to be under the 
influence of alcohol, while another 39 offenders (9%) were known to be under the 
influence of some other type of substance such as narcotics or, occasionally, prescribed 
medication.  This category also includes those offenders who had purposefully ingested 
narcotics in an attempt to avoid their detection.  This finding was to be expected 
according to prior studies in which a large percentage of offenders had recently 
consumed alcohol and/or illegal drugs at the time of the incident in question (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2006; Stetzer, 2001).   
Considering other types of altered conditions, thirty-three offenders (8%) were 
known to have had prior injuries before the incident (either because they were observed 
by the officers or because the suspect verbally expressed this), and 6 offenders (1%) 
were known to be mentally ill.  Eight offenders (2%) had other prior conditions that 
affected the incident, such as being elderly, and for the other 149 offenders no prior 
condition was known (although this does not mean that none of the above conditions 
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Ratio of Officers to Offenders 
 
 Another important characteristic to examine is the ratio of suspects to officers.  In 
about 43% of cases (n=169), the incidents involved one suspect and one officer.  This is 
in line with prior studies that indicate that single officers and single offenders represent 
the most common breakdown of actors in officer violence scenarios (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1997; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006).  In just over 3% of cases in 
the current study (n=13), the number involved was also even, with two suspects and two 
officers.  About 29% of cases (n=115) involved one suspect and two officers, and about 
13% of cases (n=49) involved one suspect and three officers.  Smaller proportions of 
cases involved one suspect and more than three officers (4% or 16 cases for 4 officers, 
2% or 7 cases for 5 officers, and 1% or 3 cases for 6 officers).  There were other cases 
in which officers outnumbered suspects but these incidents were less frequent.  About 
2% of cases (n=8) involved two suspects and three officers, one case involved two 
suspects and five officers, and one case involved three suspects and four officers. 
 There were also a few cases that involved multiple suspects against one officer, 
but this circumstance was much rarer, possibly because officers work in pairs or groups 
as often as they possibly can for safety purposes.  Less than 2% of cases (n=6) 
involved one officer and two suspects and in one case there were two officers and four 
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Weapon Use and Injuries 
 
 Because the Orlando Police Department collects these data to examine their use 
of force incidents, there is detailed information available for weapon use by the officers 
but not for the offenders.  Personal weapons (i.e. body parts) were by far the weapons 
of choice by officers.  Officers or supervisors reported the use of hands or other body 
parts either for control of the situation or as weapons in 275 of the 391 cases (about 
70%).  In 250 of those cases, more detailed information was available as follows: in 103 
cases (41%) in which personal weapons were used, hands were used for escort or 
control only, in 70 cases (28%) bodily pressure points were used to gain compliance, in 
48 cases (19%) officers initiated takedowns or tackles of some type, in 3 cases (1%) 
officers utilized open hand strikes, knee strikes, or elbow strikes, and in 25 cases (10%) 
officers used closed fist strikes or kicks to gain control (see Figure 12).   
 The next most frequent weapon used by officers was by far the Taser.  Tasers 
were used in half of all use of force incidents (n=196).  Chemical sprays (such as 
oleoresin capsicum or pepper spray) were used about in about a quarter of the cases 
(24% or 95 cases), and impact weapons (such as asp batons) were used in about 14% 
(n=54) of cases.  In 9 cases (about 2%) canine police units were deployed.  It is 
important to note that these weapon categories are not mutually exclusive—more than 
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Firearms were not listed as a weapon category for officers on the use of force 
forms because officer-involved shootings require a separate and more in-depth 
investigation.  According to the Internal Affairs Unit at OPD, however, firearms were 
discharged in only 14 cases between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008.   
 Weapon use by both the officers and the suspects led to several injuries on both 
sides.  During the course of the 391 incidents in which officers were battered, 137 of the 
620 (22%) involved officers reported receiving injuries.  Among the injured officers, 58 
(42%) reported receiving abrasions or cuts, 23 (17%) reported bruising and redness, 30 
(22%) reported muscle or joint injuries, 2 (1%) reported broken bones or possible 
broken bones, and 19 (14%) officers reported head, neck, or back injuries.  Eight 
officers (6%) also suffered significant exposure to another’s blood, a potentially 
dangerous or even fatal incident (Figure 14). 
 A much larger percentage of suspects than officers were injured in the incidents, 
although most of the injuries (as with the victim officers) were minor.  A total of 299 
suspects of the involved 425 (about 70%) reported injuries.  Of the injured suspects, a 
quarter (n=76) reported only minor Taser marks (from prongs or direct contact) and 
another 5% (n=14) reported only eye irritation from chemical sprays such as oleoresin 
capsicum.  Three percent (n=10) received bites from police dogs (not including bites to 







































suspects received other types of minor injuries such as scrapes or bruises, while about 
40% (n=121) reported intermediate level injuries such as sprains, larger cuts, or minor 
facial injuries.  Finally, about 9% (n=28) of the injured offenders reported receiving more 
serious injuries such as larger facial injuries, head injuries, or broken bones (see Figure 
15).  One-hundred eighty-nine (63%) of the injured offenders sought some level of 
medical treatment for their injuries. 
 
Incident Types and Charges 
 
The types of incidents that led to the altercation in which officers were battered were 
quite varied.  The incident types were generally in line with prior literature in that 
batteries resulting from disturbances and other types of public order issues were quite 
common (Brandl, 1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997).  The most common type 
of incident, which occurred in over a quarter of cases (27.6% or n=108), was public 
order crime such as public intoxication.  The next most prominent offense for which 
officers were called, which occurred in 13.3% of cases or 52 incidents, was violence 
against a law enforcement officer or emergency personnel.  These were often cases in 
which the officers who were battered responded to assist other officers or other 





Figure 15: Types of Reported Suspect Injuries 
 









 (n=47) were initiated because of some type of general disturbance or fight, and another 
12% (n=47) were initiated for traffic incidents such as traffic stops, crashes, or DUIs.  
Simple assault and battery cases and drug or alcohol offenses accounted for 6.9% 
(n=27) of cases each, while domestic violence related cases accounted for 4.1% (n=16) 
of incidents.   
Other serious violent crimes accounted for 3.8% or 15 cases.  Property crimes 
and attempted property crimes accounted for 3.3% of cases (n=13), while warrant 
service and backups for other agencies accounted for 1.3% (n=12) each.  One percent 
of the cases or less were initiated by: obstruction of an investigation or interference with 
the duty of law enforcement officers (n=4), “man down” calls or calls to check well-being 
(n=3), attempted suicides (n=3), mentally ill persons or Baker Act cases (cases in which 
the suspect was taken into custody for involuntary mental evaluation) (n=2), and fleeing 
and eluding or escaped prisoners (n=2).  There was one incident each of a sex crime 
with a victim (i.e. not prostitution, etc.), a weapons offense, and an alarm call.  In 3.1% 
of cases (n=12) the initial reason for the interaction between officer and suspect was 
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 Most suspects faced multiple charges stemming from these officer battery 
incidents with the most common type of charge by far resulting from the battery on the 
officer(s) itself.  In 9 out of 10 incidents (n=349), suspects were charged with resisting 
an officer with violence and/or assault or battery on a law enforcement officer.  In 
another seven percent of cases (n=28), suspects were charged with resisting an officer 
without violence. 
 Charges not relating to resisting or battering officers often provided the reason 
behind the initial interaction between officer and suspect.  In order to simplify 
understanding of these situations, these charges were categorized according to the type 
of incident and then ranked by seriousness.  In other words, if a suspect was charged 
with a violent crime and a property crime, the case was categorized with violent crimes 
because the most serious offense resulting from the case was a violent crime.  The 
charges related to the incidents break down as follows: 51 incidents (13%) involved 
violent crime charges and another 12 incidents (3.1%) involved depriving an officer of 
his or her means of communication; 9 other incidents (2.3%) involved charges for 
disobeying a law enforcement officer, fleeing, or providing false information to a law 
enforcement officer; 31 cases (7.9%) involved drug charges and 11 cases (2.8%) 
involved property crimes, while another 11 cases (2.8%) involved traffic offenses and 2 
cases (0.5%) involved the service of warrants that had been issued prior to the incident.  
Seventy-seven cases (19.7%) involved public order offenses or the violation of city 
ordinances, such as public intoxication or panhandling.  Nearly half of the cases (47.6% 
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or n=186) did not result in any charges other than those of resisting or battering an 
officer (for a breakdown of charges, see Figure 17 below). 
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While examining the data in detail is essential, this type of descriptive analysis 
cannot indicate the correlations or predictive value between officer battery and 
situational factors regarding the officers, suspects, and incidents.  The next chapter, 
Chapter Five, covers logistic regression analyses that test the relationships between 
many situational factors and battery against officers.  Then, Chapter Six includes spatial 




CHAPTER FIVE: REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 
After the detailed description of the data from Orlando Police Department that 
was discussed in Chapter Four above, regression models were estimated to test the 
potential situational and individual-level factors that might lead to battery against 
officers.  Because the dependent variable (officer battery vs. no battery) was 
dichotomous, logistic regression was the most appropriate choice for the analysis.  
Independent variables were grouped into three blocks, with the first block containing 
situational factors, the second block containing characteristics of the primary offender, 




 The first block of analysis, which contained situational factors, was comprised of 
eight independent variables.  TIME93A was a dummy variable indicating that the 
incident occurred between the hours of 9:00PM and 3:00AM rather than during other 
times of the day (1=9PM to 3AM, 0=all other times).  WEEKEND3 described whether or 
not the incident occurred during the weekend (Friday, Saturday or Sunday) or during the 
week (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday) (1=weekend, 0=weekday).  
SUMMER referred to whether the incident occurred during the summer months of June, 
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July, or August rather than during another season (1=summer, 0=other seasons).  
DTTASER was created as a dummy variable to indicate whether or not officers used 
Tasers as intermediate weapons during the use of force incident (1=taser use, 0=no 
taser use).  VIOLENT refers to the type of incident that the officers were originally 
handling when the use of force occurred, including both officer-initiated incidents and 
calls for service.  This variable was created as a dummy variable indicating violent 
incident types as opposed to other incident types such as property crimes or public 
order crimes (1=violent incident, 0=other types of incidents).  NUMEMPL and 
NUMOFND refer to whether or not the incident involved single or multiple officers and 
single or multiple offenders, respectively (1=multiple officers, 0=single officer; 1=multiple 
offenders, 0=single offender).   
Finally, NUMALCLIC refers to a count of businesses licensed to sell alcohol 
within ½ mile of the incident location (continuous variable).  This variable was of high 
interest because of its potential substantive value, but there was a substantial portion of 
cases missing that had to be dealt with before the variable could be used.  Because this 
variable was created by placing a ½ mile buffer around each incident location to obtain 
a count of the alcohol-related businesses within the area, the data relied on incidents 
that could be mapped.  Many incidents could not be mapped either because the 
incidents actually occurred outside of the city limits or because there were errors in the 
address of the incident location.  Consequently, using this variable led to a loss of 742 
cases (nearly 41%), a rather large portion.  Obviously, this caused concern that bias 
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might become an issue.  A dummy variable was created to measure whether or not this 
issue created a significant difference in the overall model.  A value of “1” indicated that 
the case involved the mean number of alcohol-related businesses in close proximity 
(14), while “0” indicated other values.  This variable was not found to be significant, 
indicating that the loss of cases because of the mapping issues did not pose a major 
issue for the validity of the regression results.  Therefore, the variable for the number of 
alcohol-related businesses within ½ mile of each incident was included in the analysis, 
but mean substitution was used to keep bias from the variable to a minimum9. 
The second block of independent variables added in five characteristics of the 
primary offender.  OFF1WHT referred to the race of the primary offender (1=white, 
0=non-white), OFF1_AGE referred to the age of the primary offender (continuous 
variable), and OFF1_SEX referred to the gender of the primary offender (1=male, 
0=female).  OFF_BMI was a continuous variable referring to the primary offender’s body 
mass index, and OFF1ALC referred to whether or not the offender was perceived to 
have been under the influence of alcohol at the time the incident occurred (1=alcohol 
use, 0=no alcohol use). 
The third block added in independent variables that described characteristics of 
the primary officer involved.  EMPL1WHT referred to the primary officer’s race (1=white, 
0=non-white).  EMPL1AGE referred to the primary officer’s age (continuous variable), 
                                            
9
 The models were run both with and without the NUMALCLIC variable, and also with the NUMALCLIC 
variable with mean substitution employed for the missing values.  There were few differences between 
the significant factors in each model.  The one potentially important difference was that the number of 
offenders was a significant predictor of battery in earlier models and this effect disappeared in the final 
model which used mean substitution. 
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and EMPL1SX referred to the officer’s gender (1=male, 0=female).  For a complete 
review of the variables involved in the logistic regression models, see Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables in Logistic Regression Models 
Variable Name Measurement 
DUMMY_DV (dependent 
variable) 
1=officer battery, 0=no officer battery 
TIME93A 1=9:00PM to 3:00AM, 0=all other times 
WEEKEND3 1=Friday, Saturday or Sunday, 0=Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday or Thursday 
SUMMER 1=June, July or August, 0=other months 
DTTASER 1=taser used, 0= no taser used 
VIOLENT 1=violent original incident/call, 0=other types of original 
incidents 
NUMEMPL 1=multiple officers, 0=single officer 
NUMOFND 1=multiple offenders, 0=single offender 
MSFORALCLIC Continuous variable, count of the number of businesses 
licensed to sell alcohol within ½ mile of the incident 
location (with mean substitution for missing cases) 
OFF1WHT 1=white offender, 0=non-white offender 
OFF1_AGE Continuous variable, age of offender in years 
OFF1_SEX 1=male offender, 0=female offender 
OFF_BMI Continuous variable of offender body mass index (BMI) 
OFF1ALC 1=offender had consumed alcohol, 0=offender was not 
known to have consumed alcohol 
EMPL1WHT 1=white officer, 0=non-white officer 
EMPL1AGE Continuous variable, age of officer in years 







 The results of the regression models (found in Table 2 below) indicated that 
several variables were significant indicators of officer battery.  Overall, the first model, 
which contained only the situational independent variables, was highly significant 
(p=.000, Chi-Square=45.568, df=8) but only explained about 4.1% (Nagelkerke=.041) of 
the variance among use of force cases that involved officer battery and use of force 
cases that did not involve officer battery.  In this model, two variables were significant.  
The odds of battery for incidents involving multiple officers were actually 94.2% higher 
than incidents involving a single officer (odds ratio=1.942, p<.001)10.  Model One results 
also indicated that the odds of battery for incidents occurring in areas where there were 
higher numbers of businesses licensed to sell alcohol were slightly higher (odds 
ratio=1.008, p<.05), but this effect was not found in subsequent models. 
 Model two included the situational variables, but added in characteristics of the 
primary offender as well; this model was also highly significant (p=.000, Chi-
Square=81.272, df=13) although overall it explained only 7.3% of the variance between 
cases involving officer battery and cases that did not (Nagelkerke=.073).  When 
offender characteristics were included, the number of alcohol-related businesses was 
not significant, but the number of officers involved remained an important contributor to 
                                            
10
In cases of field training, which may last between 4 ½ and 8 months, two officers are in each patrol 
vehicle.  Also, when personnel are available, officers “double up” in the City’s more active districts.  
Otherwise, it is Orlando Police Department policy for officers to ride one per patrol vehicle. 
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officer battery situations with little change in odds ratio or significance.  The odds of 
battery among cases with multiple officers were 92.2% higher than cases with single 
officers (odds ratio=1.922, p<.001). 
 In Model Two, there were three new significant variables as well, including the 
gender of the offender, the weight of the offender, and whether or not the offender was 
known to have recently consumed alcohol before the incident.  The odds of battery in 
cases involving male primary offenders were actually 56.1% lower than cases involving 
female primary offenders (odds ratio=.439, p<.001).  Among cases involving offenders 
with higher BMI, the odds of battery were also slightly higher (odds ratio=1.045, p<.01).  
Furthermore, the odds of battery for cases in which the primary offender was known to 
have recently consumed alcohol were about 39.8% higher than those in which the 
offender was not known to have recently consumed alcohol (odds ratio=1.398, p<.05). 
 Model Three included all of the above factors and also included some basic 
demographic characteristics of the primary officers involved, including race, age, and 
gender.  The full model remained highly significant overall (p=.000, Chi-Square=82.983, 
df=16), but explained only about 7.4% of the variance between use of force cases that 
involved officer battery and those cases that did not (Nagelkerke=.074).  In this model, 
all of the factors that had previously been significant in Model Two remained significant.  
Cases involving multiple officers resulted in 91.6% higher odds of battery (odds 
ratio=1.916, p<.001).  Odds of battery in cases involving male offenders were about 
54.8% lower than those with female offenders (odds ratio=.452, p<.001), and incidents 
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with offenders with higher BMI had very slightly lower odds of officer battery (odds 
ratio=1.045, p<.01).  Incidents involving offenders who had recently consumed alcohol 
also remained a significant factor; the odds of these incidents involving officer battery 
were about 40.8% higher than incidents in which the offender was not known to have 
recently consumed alcohol (odds ratio=1.408, p<.05).  However, none of the newly 
added independent variables which contained officer demographic information were 
significant indicators of officer battery.  See Table 2 for results of all three regression 




 While most of the results of the logistic regression models were expected, a few 
findings were surprising.  The full model containing all sixteen independent variables 
only explained about 7.4% of the variation between use of force cases involving officer 
battery and use of force cases in which no officer battery was reported.  This seems 
low, but then again there is very little to compare this result to as violence against 
officers has not often been studied with this method in prior research.  Garner and 
Maxwell’s (2002) study of police use of force and suspect resistance used logistic 





 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE Exp (b) B SE Exp (b) B SE Exp (b) 
9PM – 3AM .179 .125 1.196 .095 .132 1.099 .097 .133 1.101 
Weekend  .068 .123 1.071 -.022 .126 .978 -.016 .126 .984 
Summer -.139 .142 .870 -.146 .143 .865 -.146 .143 .864 
Taser Use .058 .121 1.060 .132 .127 1.141 .120 .127 1.128 
Violent Call -.146 .167 .764 -.171 .170 .843 -.171 .170 .843 
Multiple 
Officers 
.663 .121 1.942*** .653 .123 1.922*** -.650 .123 1.916*** 
Multiple 
Offenders 




.008 .003 1.008* .007 .003 1.007 .007 .003 1.007 
White 
Offender 
   .151 .137 1.163 .154 .137 1.166 
 Offender 
Age 
   -.004 .006 .996 -.006 .006 .994 
Male 
Offender 
   -.822 .201 .439*** -.794 .203 .452*** 
Offender 
BMI 




   .335 .144 1.398* .342 .144 1.408* 
White Officer       -.030 .141 .971 
Officer Age       -.006 .009 .994 
Male Officer       -.332 .284 .717 
Step Chi-
Square 
45.568*** 35.704*** 1.711 
Model Chi-
Square 
45.568*** 81.272*** 82.983*** 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
8 13 16 
Nagelkerke 
R-Square 
.041 .073 .074 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Results—Dependent Variable is Officer Battery (1) vs. No Officer Battery (0) 




and they found that only nine of the forty-one independent variables examined had a 
consistent, significant effect on whether or not force was used.  Even in this inclusive, 
methodologically sound study, two-thirds of the variation in police use of force remained 
unexplained (Garner & Maxwell, 2002). 
Obviously, there are factors at work here that the current regression models do 
not capture.  This in itself should not be a surprise considering that all police-citizen 
interactions involve a high degree of perception on both sides.  Officers or offenders 
may perceive a look or an aggressive stance that is not measured here, and take this as 
offensive.  The information available when a call for service comes to the officer is often 
skewed if one of the involved parties is the person who calls for help, and this may 
affect the officer’s perception of the incident (and the aggression levels of those 
involved) before he or she even arrives on scene.  Incidents that occur among crowds 
of people must be treated differently by law enforcement officers than those which are 
contained within a residence where the involved parties are the only people on scene.  
Furthermore, the personal experience of officers in certain neighborhoods can color the 
way the officer handles the call.  Conversely, offenders who have had negative 
interactions with law enforcement personnel in the past are likely to be on guard for 
perceived slights or mistreatment in a way that many other citizens would not.  These 
types of information were not available in the current study, but some of these issues 
undoubtedly affected the way these incidents played out, and whether or not the use of 
force led to violence against the involved officer.  These types of issues underscore the 
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importance of using varied methods in studying any law enforcement issue to gain as 
much information about different aspects of police-citizen interaction as possible. 
 Other results, while sometimes counterintuitive, followed the course of prior 
studies on the subject.  Incidents involving single officers were actually much less likely 
to involve officer battery.  It seems that there would be safety in numbers, but according 
to prior research this is not the case.  Kaminski and Sorensen (1995) and Wilson, 
Brunk, and Meyer (1990) also found that single officers were in a better position than 
multiple officers—in these studies, single officers were less likely to be injured.  Perhaps 
this is because multiple officers automatically respond to situations that are known to be 
more volatile at the outset, and during which officer battery and injury are more likely.  It 
is also possible that when faced with multiple officers, rather than feeling intimidated, 
the offenders felt the need to act offensively in order to gain control of the situation or 
save face.  This would likely be especially true in cases where friends of the offender or 
bystanders were nearby watching the interaction11. 
 Also, cases involving female offenders were much more likely to involve officer 
battery than those involving male offenders.  While this seems at first to be contrary to 
the logic that males are generally more aggressive than females, it does follow what 
would be expected from prior research on the subject which indicates that females are 
generally more likely to be disrespectful toward officers than males (Engel, 2003).   
                                            
11
 OPD’s use of force forms listed the number of witnesses as a variable, but this was not considered in 
the current study because only those witnesses who chose to stay and talk to police and provide their 




 The other significant factors were basically as expected.  Offenders with higher 
BMI were slightly more likely to batter officers, while offenders who were known to have 
recently consumed alcohol were much more likely to batter officers.  Alcohol use has 
been shown in previous research to be correlated with many types of violence, including 
violence against police officers (Garner & Maxwell, 2002; Kavanagh, 1997), so this 
result was not surprising. 
Perhaps more surprising than those variables found to be significant were the 
variables that were not significant.  Several factors that seemed in prior research to be 
important were not actually found to be significant in the current study.  Part of this 
discrepancy may be due to the specific location under study.  For example, prior 
research has indicated that violence is more prevalent in the summer months (CA 
POST, 2001), but in this case season had no effect12.  However, in Florida in general 
and especially as far south as Orlando, the seasons do not change as they do in more 
northern areas.  Summer weather lasts through much of the year, so it is logical that the 
season would not have the effect found in other studies. 
 It is also interesting that there was no significant difference between cases 
occurring on the weekends rather than weekdays, or cases occurring during nighttime 
hours rather than daytime hours.  There was also no evidence in these analyses that 
the use of intermediate weapons by officers (in this case, Tasers) or the type of call that 
officers were responding to was a significant factor in predicting battery.  Race was also 
                                            
12
 Because of Florida’s uniquely warm climate, a variable that defined “summer” as April through 
September was also run.  This variable was not significant either. 
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not a factor on either side, nor was age.  Incidents with multiple offenders were not 
statistically more likely to involve officer battery than those with single offenders.  
Furthermore, there was no significant effect found for incidents occurring near large 
numbers of businesses selling alcohol versus those with less alcohol sold, and 
presumably less demand (except in Model One, and that effect was slight).  All of these 
variables represent factors that reason and prior research would lead us to believe are 
important, but none of them were found to be significant predictors of officer battery in 
this dataset.   
Furthermore, in this study the demographic characteristics of the officers did not 
have a significant effect on officer battery at all.  Officer race, age, and sex were all 
found to be nonsignificant predictors of officer battery.  It appears that some of the 
situational factors of the incident had a much greater effect on whether or not officers 
were battered than such uncontrollable factors as demographics.  This is encouraging in 
the sense that many factors that do or do not lead to officer battery can be controlled 
and accounted for in training and agency policy. 
 Of course, the above regression results represent only one part of the current 
study.  It is important to consider all available data, including geographical factors.  
Chapter Six: Spatial Analyses will describe these spatial factors as well as the analyses 
used to test their significance and the results. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SPATIAL ANALYSES 
 
 The purpose of the analyses in this chapter was to examine the geographic 
characteristics of police officer battery in Orlando in three ways.  First, the analyses 
considered the general characteristics of officer battery location and whether or not the 
incidents were clustered geographically.  Second, the analyses examined the possible 
connection between officer battery and social disorganization theory.  Finally, the spatial 
analyses considered the possible connection between officer battery and alcohol use. 
 Before any analyses were run, it was important to consider the characteristics of 
the study area.  The city of Orlando is divided into two main halves, as seen in Figure 
18.  The northwestern portion of the city jurisdiction contains the downtown area as well 
as most all other business and residential districts within the city.  The southeastern 
portion contains the Orlando International Airport, which was annexed by the City in 
1982 (City of Orlando, 2006).  There are relatively few instances in which the city police 
department responds to the airport area, so while they do patrol this area, it was not as 
relevant to this particular portion of the study as the upper portion of the city.  Therefore, 
all spatial analyses were focused on the more northern and western portion of the city in 











 As demonstrated in Figure 19 below, the main portion of the city of Orlando (that 
portion considered in the current study) is bisected from north to south by Interstate-4 (I-
4).  In the central part of the city, the central business district is located just east of I-4 
while some neighborhoods that are known to be high-crime areas, such as Parramore 
and Holden, are located just to the west of I-4.  These are predominantly African-
American neighborhoods which are poverty stricken and commonly thought to be 
affected by social disorganization.  Located in the central business district is an area 
concentrated along South Orange Avenue where many bars and nightclubs are located.  
These businesses are frequented by both locals and tourists to the area, and together 
they comprise an area in which there is a large amount of alcohol consumption and 
crowding conditions, especially at nights and on the weekends. 
On the far eastern side of the city, Semoran Boulevard runs from north to south 
and provides the main route of travel into the Orlando International Airport (see Figure 
19).  The Semoran Blvd. area has a high Hispanic population and is a common area for 
crime occurrences.  The Orlando area is known for its tourist attractions such as Walt 
Disney World and Universal Studios.  Walt Disney World is not located within the city 
limits of Orlando, but Universal Studios and some other attractions are, and they can be 












attractions are located within the City of Orlando and some are on the other side of the 
boundary, there is a large amount of fluidity between the City and Orange County 
because of the tourists crossing back and forth in that general area.  The crowding and 
factors that come with it, such as large quantities of alcohol consumption, are not 
confined to one jurisdiction or another.   
 Figure 20 demonstrates the locations of most13 of the officer battery incidents 
within the city limits (n=367).  Upon a simple visual inspection, there immediately 
appeared to be more clustering of incidents around the downtown areas, especially in 
the central business district, and around the Holden and Parramore neighborhoods.  
The areas around Semoran Blvd. and the tourist areas showed several incidents, but it 
was not immediately clear whether or not there were enough incidents in a small 




 While a visual inspection was a helpful place to start, statistical analyses were 
necessary to determine whether or not there was indeed clustering of officer battery 
incidents.  Three analyses of clustering were conducted14, each successively more 
 
                                            
13
Six percent of addresses within City limits were left unmatched due to data errors or technical 
difficulties.  While there is no generally regarded “acceptable” address match rate (Harries, 1999), a rate 
of above 90% is quite high. 
14





Figure 20: Locations of Officer Battery Incidents 
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statistically robust.  The first analysis involved creating a chloropleth map which would 
show the frequency of officer batteries by census tract15.  When the battery locations 
were aggregated to the census tract level, there was the definite appearance of 
clustering in the downtown business district as well as in the high-crime neighborhoods 
just west of I-4 (see Figure 21).  There also appeared to be potential clustering in the 
tourist areas in the southwest portion of the city.  These positive results on the 
chloropleth map provided reason to conduct a more robust type of analysis, the nearest 
neighbor index. 
 The nearest neighbor index (NNI) was conducted as both a 1st-order analysis 
and a k-order analysis where k=100 (a common value for these tests).  This means that 
the index of the 1st-order analysis displayed the strength of clustering between each 
incident and its nearest neighbor, while the k-order analysis where k=100 would show 
the strength of clustering to the 100th level.  In other words, the index would describe the 
strength of clustering between each incident and its nearest neighbor, second nearest 
neighbor, third nearest neighbor, and so on until the one-hundredth nearest neighbor.  
An index value of over 1.0 indicates no statistically significant clustering, while an index 
value of less than 1.0 indicates significant clustering and values closer to 0.0 indicate 
stronger clustering. 
 
                                            
15
 Because the census tract boundaries were not designated according to the city limits of Orlando, the 
census tract boundaries had to be adjusted slightly to match up with the Orlando boundaries for mapping 





Figure 21: Officer Battery Incidents by Census Tract 
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 The results of the 1st-order nearest neighbor index can be found in Table 3.  The 
index value of 0.33874 indicates strong clustering between each incident and its nearest 
neighbor.  The k-order analysis to 100 also indicated that the clustering of officer battery 
incidents was strong, where even to the 100th order the index value was well under 1.0 
at 0.61321 (see Table 4, next page).  For complete results and associated statistics of 
both the 1st-Order NNI and the k-order (k=100) NNI, see Appendices F and G 
respectively. 
 
Table 3: Results of 1st-Order Nearest Neighbor Index 
Sample Size 367 
Mean Random Distance 1890.14 feet 
Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance 640.27 feet 
Standard Deviation of Nearest Neighbor Distance 1249.97 feet 
Minimum Distance 0.00 feet 
Maximum Distance 92027.24 feet 
P-value (one tail) 0.0001 
P-value (two tail) 0.0001 
Nearest Neighbor Index 0.33874 
 
 
 The nearest neighbor analysis is a statistically robust strategy, and in this case 
the analyses indicated that there was strong geographical clustering of officer battery 
incidents, but this type of analysis does not describe where clustering occurs.  For a 
reliable test of the location of clustering, a quartic kernel density interpolation was 
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conducted.  By weighting incidents’ location in reference to a grid of the entire study 
area, interpolations can provide information as to the location as well as strength of 
clustering.  The results of the kernel density interpolation, which demonstrates stronger 
clustering 
 
Table 4: Results of k-Order (k=100) Nearest Neighbor Index 
Sample Size 367 
Mean Random Distance 1890.14 feet 
Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance 640.27 feet 
Standard Deviation of Nearest Neighbor Distance 1249.97 feet 
Minimum Distance 0.00 feet 
Maximum Distance 92027.24 feet 
P-value (one tail) 0.0001 
P-value (two tail) 0.0001 
Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 1 0.33874 
Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 2 0.40725 
 Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 3 0.43150 
… … 
Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 98 0.61450 
Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 99 0.61417 
Nearest Neighbor Index—Order 100 0.61321 
 
 
with higher z-scores and thus darker color shades, indicated that there was extremely 
strong clustering centered in the downtown business district and emanating out west of 
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I-4 to the Holden and Parramore neighborhoods.  In this analysis, there was no 
significant clustering found in either the tourist district or in the Semoran Blvd. area (see 
Figure 22 below). 
 Upon determining the extent and location of clustering of officer battery incidents, 
the next step was to attempt to determine what factors might lead these areas to display 
more violence against officers.  One potential explanation comes from social 
disorganization theory, in which areas of higher social disorganization (often indicated 
by high poverty, low educational attainment, and high residential mobility among other 
factors) are also high crime areas.  To compare areas with more officer batteries to 
areas of high social disorganization, a chloropleth map was produced which showed the 
social disorganization of census tracts using the scale created earlier in this study16.  
Then, the chloropleth map of officer batteries (Figure 21, page 96) was compared with 
the chloropleth map of social disorganization (see Figure 23).   
 It was obvious upon visual comparison that the main areas of officer battery did 
not match up to the most disorganized areas as expected.  The most dangerous area 
for officers, the downtown business district/bar area, was not found to be highly 
disorganized.  The tourist areas, also dangerous to officers, were not overly 
disorganized either.  Conversely, many areas of the city were demonstrated to be highly 
                                            
16










Figure 23: Social Disorganization Levels by Census Tract 
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disorganized but not overly dangerous to officers.  The areas extending west and north 
from Parramore and Holden were highly disorganized, as were some tracts along 
Semoran Blvd. and a few small tracts just north of the main tourism area; however, 
none of these areas was overly dangerous for officers.  There may have been several 
reasons for this disjunction.  High violence areas for officers were largely commercial, 
but many common indicators of social disorganization, such as residential mobility and 
poverty level, are measures of residential populations and do not apply well to 
commercial areas.  Therefore, the commercial areas in question may not show the 
signs of social disorganization that residential areas would.  Also, the suspects may 
have been traveling from other areas and may not actually reside in the areas where the 
batteries took place.  In any case, the main areas of danger for officers seemed to have 
only one thing in common that was theoretically connected to the violence against 
officers—they are the main areas in which a large amount of the city’s alcohol 
consumption and crowding conditions take place. 
 Considering the apparent lack of connection between officer battery and social 
disorganization and the potential connection between officer battery and alcohol use 
(and potential crowding), further analyses were conducted that more closely examined 
these factors.  The locations of businesses with licenses to sell alcohol within the city of 
Orlando were retrieved from the website of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco, which is part of the Florida Department of Business and Professional 
Regulation (2010).  The list of licenses in Florida was restricted to include only those 
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businesses with Orlando addresses (n=2042) and then those locations were further 
truncated to include only those licenses that were acquired before or during the study 
period (i.e. before December 31, 2008; n=1466).  Mapping was then attempted for the 
addresses, and once the addresses that were not actually located within the city limits 
or those with incomplete information were eliminated, there were 493 addresses of 
businesses with current alcohol licenses within the city limits of Orlando. 
 These 493 addresses were mapped and then aggregated to create a chloropleth 
map of the number of businesses licensed to sell alcohol by census tract.  A 
comparison of the chloropleth maps of officer batteries (Figure 21, page 96) and alcohol 
licenses (Figure 24 below) demonstrated a much closer geographical link than that 
between officer batteries and social disorganization.  Furthermore, when the exact 
locations of alcohol-licensed businesses were laid over the chloropleth map of officer 
battery by census tract, the correlation could even more clearly be seen (Figure 25).  
While there were high concentrations of alcohol-licensed businesses on main roads 
without high levels of officer battery, the main clusters of businesses that sell alcohol 
were clearly found in the same areas where officers were most at risk.  These areas 
specifically were the downtown bar area, the neighborhoods just west of I-4 such as 
Parramore and Holden, around the main tourist area, and possibly on the east side of 















 It was possible that certain types of alcohol licenses may also be affecting the 
level of violence against officers.  Some businesses on the register were licensed to sell 
alcohol for off premises consumption only (i.e. liquor stores, package stores).  Other 
businesses were licensed to sell alcohol for on premises consumption only; these 
included bars, nightclubs, social clubs, etc.  Still other businesses were licensed to sell 
closed packages for off premises consumption as well as alcohol by the drink for on 
premises consumption.  A map was created to demonstrate the locations of these 
different types of alcohol-selling businesses (see Figure 26 below).  The types of 
alcohol licenses, here designated by color, provide a visual layout of where each type of 
licensed business is predominantly located.  In the downtown bar area just east of I-4, 
most businesses that are licensed to sell alcohol are selling alcohol either for on 
premises consumption or for both on or off premises consumption.  In the disorganized 
areas west of I-4, the opposite is true; businesses are licensed to sell either for off 
premises consumption or for both on and off premises consumption.  The idea that the 
neighborhoods west of I-4 have more closed package alcohol sold for off premises 
consumption is consistent with many low income areas.  And the downtown business 
district has a strong nightlife and several bars and is a popular area for drinking and 
partying on site, so this is consistent with the idea that the business district has a 
stronger concentration of licenses for consuming alcohol on premises.  This could be an 
important determinant of violence against officers because on premises consumption 




Figure 26: Locations and Types of Businesses Licensed to Sell Alcoholic Beverages 
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during business hours but also outside after the bars close down and crowds of people, 
most of whom have been consuming alcohol, flood the sidewalks and streets at the 
same time.   
The tourist area appears to have a mixture of alcohol licenses, those which allow 
businesses to sell for on or off premises consumption or both.  This is surprising 
considering that there is an assumption in the main tourist areas that visitors are going 
out to clubs and restaurants to consume alcohol—it appears that they are also 
purchasing the alcohol to consume in other areas such as their hotel rooms.  Finally, the 
last area of interest was around the northern portion of Semoran Blvd. where Semoran 
meets State Road 408.  In this area, as around the Parramore and Holden areas, there 
appears to be a mixture of businesses selling alcohol for off premises consumption or 




Based on the spatial analyses conducted here, we can conclude that there was a 
strong clustering of officer battery incidents in Orlando throughout 2006, 2007, and 
2008.  Depending on the analysis, there was definitely clustering around the downtown 
business district and the neighborhoods just west of I-4 such as Parramore and Holden.  
There was potential clustering in the main tourist areas of the city as well and possibly 
to a lesser extent around the northern portion of Semoran Blvd.   
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Tests of a potential relationship between officer battery and social 
disorganization were not so predictable, however.  There did not appear to be a strong 
relationship between violence against officers and social disorganization, but there did 
appear to be a relationship (at least geographically) between violence against officers 
and alcohol consumption.  Since we know that alcohol use often leads to disturbances 
and disturbances are the main type of call that leads to violence against officers (Brandl, 
1996; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1997), it is logical that those areas in which more 
alcohol is sold (and presumably consumed) would be more dangerous to officers. 
The results of this chapter, as well as Chapter Four: Descriptive Statistics and 
Chapter Five: Regression Analyses, paint a more complete picture of the characteristics 
of violence against police officers and their potential causes than we have had available 
before.  There are numerous policy implications inherent in these findings.  We will 
discuss these implications next, along with the conclusions that may be drawn from this 




CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
The purpose of this study was two-fold.  First, this project was a test of sorts for 
the criminal events perspective as an explanation for violence against police officers.  
Second, the project was designed to determine the validity and strength of potential 
predictors of officer violence in Orlando.  In the end, the results were mixed.  As 
discussed in Chapter Three: Methods, support for the criminal events perspective would 
be defined as discovering significant predictors of officer violence in all facets of 
analysis, including situational and geographic factors as well as individual factors of 
both the suspects and the officers involved.  Finding significance in every facet of the 
battery event would have lent credibility to the idea that officer battery is indeed a 
criminal event with a beginning, middle, and end.  In this sense, the criminal events 
perspective as an explanation of officer violence was not supported.  While situational 
and geographic factors as well as some factors pertaining to the offenders were found 
to be significant, no factor relating to the specific officer involved was significant. 
Of course, this may have been due to specific limitations within the study 
methodology and data set.  Fewer officer variables were available for testing than 
situational or offender variables.  Perhaps the officer variables that are of the most 
importance were not available in this dataset.  Although the criminal events perspective 
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was not supported as an explanation for violence against officers in this study, it would 
be premature to assume that it would not be a useful explanation when using other data 
or studying other areas.  More research is needed here. 
The second goal of the study was to identify potential correlates of officer 
violence; two situational variables and three variables related specifically to offenders 
were determined to be significant.  Regression analyses identified one situational 
variable17 as well as all three offender variables, while the other situational variable 
(location) was determined through spatial analysis.   
A particularly strong finding from this study was that use of force incidents with 
multiple officers are more likely to involve battery against at least one of those officers.  
Unfortunately, the data available did not provide temporal information as to whether or 
not there were multiple officers on scene right away or if those officers arrived on scene 
at a later time, but it appears that there is not safety in numbers in these cases, nor do 
multiple officers automatically intimidate potential batterers.  This is not to say that 
officers should not work together and provide back-up for each other as often as 
possible; clearly many an officer has been spared assault or worse because his or her 
partners were ready to assist in any way necessary.  It is to say, however, that officers 
should not think and act complacently simply because there are more of them than 
there are suspects.  Furthermore, officers should not rely on sheer numbers or strength 
to control a situation because they assume offenders will be intimidated—clearly this is 
                                            
17
 The independent variable describing the number of alcohol-selling businesses nearby was significant 
only in the first model, and therefore it is not included in the discussion here. 
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not the case, and when physical confrontation can be avoided by using verbal skills or 
whatever other means are available, it should be.   
 The other main situational variable of importance was the area in which the 
incident occurred.  There was strong evidence of clustering of officer batteries in the 
City of Orlando.  This is an area in which knowledge is power.  Knowing which areas 
are most prevalent for violence against officers is an excellent way to protect officers.  
Simple strategies such as doubling officers per car when possible in those areas or 
using more aggressive patrol strategies such as zero-tolerance policing could make a 
big difference in the safety of OPD’s officers.  By all indications, OPD is aware of the 
most dangerous areas for its officers and is currently using these strategies.  These 
results in this case, then, stress the importance of continuing to do so. 
 In addition to these situational variables, three characteristics of the offenders 
were found to be significant predictors of officer battery.  Female offenders were much 
more likely to batter officers than male offenders.  Although the thinking patterns in the 
criminal justice system regarding gender have been changing, stereotypes still exist, 
and it appears that they can easily get officers into trouble.  Officers must be trained to 
be on guard against physical danger from females as well as males, and while they 
should continue to consider differences such as physical size of the offender when 
making decisions about defensive tactics, they should not assume that women are 
“gentler” or less likely to assault or batter them than men.  The results of this study 
indicate that quite the contrary is true. 
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 The finding that offender size (measured by weight) was a significant predictor of 
officer battery was an interesting one.  While this variable was significant to the .01 
level, it did not have a major impact on the likelihood of battery.  In fact, pound by 
pound, incidents involving heavier offenders increased the likelihood of officer battery by 
less than 1%.  This was not the most useful finding, especially considering that most 
officers are naturally going to be more wary of larger offenders without being told to do 
so! 
 The final major finding, while not unexpected, is quite important.  Offenders who 
were known to have consumed alcohol within the few hours before the incident in 
question were much more likely to batter officers than those who were not known to 
have recently consumed alcohol.  This is in line with prior research on the subject, and 
with common sense, but it cannot hurt to stress the point.  People who have consumed 
alcohol are less inhibited and more likely to do things that they would not ordinarily do.  
Even someone who is “stumbling drunk” and lacks the coordination to walk a straight 
line may have the strength and willingness to pull a trigger.  His or her aim probably will 
not be very accurate, but is it worth the chance?  The impulsiveness of the intoxicated, if 
nothing else, calls for increased vigilance. 
 The fact that situational and offender characteristics were significant predictors of 
officer battery and officer characteristics were not actually bodes well for the practical 
usefulness of this study.  Officer demographics, after all, cannot be changed by the 
officer—sex, age, and race are pretty well determined at this point.  The factors that can 
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be changed, thankfully, are the ones that appear to matter according to this study.  Of 
course we cannot change the sex, age, or race of offenders, either, but we can 
understand how these differences affect officer interactions and use this information for 
policy and training purposes, just as we can be aware of the differences between single 
and multiple officer calls and the areas in which the calls are occurring.  Understanding 
the characteristics of the incidents in which officers are battered and injured is the best 
way to combat those batteries and injuries. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
This study filled several gaps in prior research.  The criminal events perspective 
as an explanation for officer violence was tested for the first time.  A new data source 
was explored, and it provided some crucial information, especially for the local area in 
which it was collected.  Spatial analyses that had not previously been conducted on 
violence against police officers were conducted in this study, and with useful results.  
There is, however, much more work to be done. 
Studies at other agencies and in other geographical areas are necessary for a 
comparison of results.  For other agencies that collect use of force data and/or data on 
violence against their officers, similar projects could indicate whether or not the results 
found here are generalizable to other areas or are mostly specific to Orlando (which is, 
after all, a rather unique city).  Further support or refutation of the criminal events 
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perspective as an explanation of violence against officers could also be discovered 
through studies conducted in other areas and at other agencies. 
Further investigation is also needed into the disjuncture between areas of social 
disorganization and areas of danger to officers.  Perhaps there are positive intervening 
factors in some disorganized areas that counteract the disrespect for formal social 
control agents that would be expected there.  Community social service agencies and/or 
churches could be mapped and compared in further efforts to determine why some 
areas are more or less dangerous for police than others.  Along these same lines, 
continued investigation is needed into the seemingly strong link between police violence 
and alcohol use.  It is important to understand whether or not officer violence is affected 
by the type of alcohol consumption (i.e. on or off premises) or the characteristics of 
those who often use alcohol in the area. 
Additionally, more investigation is needed into the nature of the relationship 
between officer violence and suspect gender.  The current study found, as has prior 
research, that females were more likely to batter officers than males.  This does not 
necessarily mean that female offenders are more dangerous to officers as far as the 
chance of injury, however.  Future studies into this interplay between gender and officer 
violence should attempt to determine whether or not female offenders are also more 
likely to injure officers or to use weapons against officers.  This knowledge would help 
shape training and policy decisions further. 
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 Finally, it is also absolutely critical that we look into other, new explanations for 
officer violence.  The explanatory power of the regression models in this study was 
paltry.  We are obviously missing factors that help determine the outcome of these 
incidents.  While this type of rigorous statistical testing is necessary and serves a useful 
purpose, we are neglecting to investigate these incidents in the detail that cannot be 
examined through quantitative analysis.  Qualitative analysis could provide more in-
depth information about the perceptions and the interplay of the actions of both the 
officer and the offender.  Case studies and interviews are necessary next steps in 
determining what other traits or conditions might lead officers to be battered, or worse. 
 In the end, Orlando Police Department has obviously made some very good 
decisions regarding the safety of its officers.  Hopefully, this study will provide 
information that agency administrators can use to further protect their officers and 
decrease officer violence in the area.  Perhaps this project has also introduced some 
new methods of studying violence against police officers that will be useful in other 
areas.  Maybe it has served to confirm or refute the importance of some variables that 
are commonly held as predictors of this type of violence.  Maybe it will spurn new 
projects that will substantially lower the rate of violence against officers.  Meanwhile, 
America’s police officers, deputies, and agents will continue to protect us every day and 











APPENDIX B: ORLANDO POLICE DEPARTMENT USE OF FORCE 















































































APPENDIX D: COMPARISON OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 
VARIABLES FROM US CENSUS 2000 AND AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 

























--% of HH* on public assistance** 








--% of renter-occupied housing units 













Social Disorganization Variables for City of Orlando from Census 2000 and American 
Communities Survey 2006-2008 3-year Estimates 
*households 
**public assistance=general assistance including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, but not 














Output Created 28-Jun-2010 15:33:19 
Comments  




Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 1812 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing 
Syntax LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES 
DUMMY_DV 
  /METHOD=ENTER DTTASER, TIME93A, 
VIOLENT, NUMEMPL, NUMOFND, 
SUMMER, WEEKEND3, MSFORALCLIC 
  /METHOD=ENTER OFF1_AGE, 
OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT, 
OFF1_SEX 
  /METHOD=ENTER EMPL1AGE, 
EMPL1WHT, EMPL1SX 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 




Output Created 28-Jun-2010 15:33:19 
Comments  




Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 1812 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing 
Syntax LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES 
DUMMY_DV 
  /METHOD=ENTER DTTASER, TIME93A, 
VIOLENT, NUMEMPL, NUMOFND, 
SUMMER, WEEKEND3, MSFORALCLIC 
  /METHOD=ENTER OFF1_AGE, 
OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT, 
OFF1_SEX 
  /METHOD=ENTER EMPL1AGE, 
EMPL1WHT, EMPL1SX 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
Resources Processor Time 0:00:00.078 
Elapsed Time 0:00:00.079 
 
 






Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 1678 92.6 
Missing Cases 134 7.4 
Total 1812 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 1812 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
NO BATTERY 0 





















AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
Step 0 DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST NO BATTERY 1311 0 100.0 
148 
 
ONE OFFICER OCCUR? BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
367 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   78.1 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -1.273 .059 464.792 1 .000 .280 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
   Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables DTTASER .183 1 .668 
TIME93A 3.516 1 .061 
VIOLENT .620 1 .431 
NUMEMPL 30.639 1 .000 
NUMOFND 4.112 1 .043 
SUMMER 1.275 1 .259 
WEEKEND3 1.176 1 .278 
MSFORALCLIC 7.805 1 .005 
Overall Statistics 46.119 8 .000 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
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  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 45.568 8 .000 
Block 45.568 8 .000 




Step -2 Log likelihood 






 .027 .041 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter 
















AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
Step 1 DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST 
ONE OFFICER OCCUR? 
NO BATTERY 1311 0 100.0 
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
367 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   78.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
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  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 DTTASER .058 .121 .231 1 .631 1.060 
TIME93A .179 .125 2.058 1 .151 1.196 
VIOLENT -.146 .167 .764 1 .382 .864 
NUMEMPL .663 .121 30.155 1 .000 1.942 
NUMOFND .327 .233 1.963 1 .161 1.387 
SUMMER -.139 .142 .970 1 .325 .870 
WEEKEND3 .068 .123 .309 1 .578 1.071 
MSFORALCLIC .008 .003 6.089 1 .014 1.008 
Constant -1.857 .155 142.950 1 .000 .156 




Block 2: Method = Enter 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 35.704 5 .000 
Block 35.704 5 .000 




Step -2 Log likelihood 










Step -2 Log likelihood 






 .047 .073 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter 
















AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
Step 1 DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST 
ONE OFFICER OCCUR? 
NO BATTERY 1299 12 99.1 
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
355 12 3.3 
Overall Percentage   78.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 DTTASER .132 .127 1.090 1 .296 1.141 
TIME93A .095 .132 .510 1 .475 1.099 
VIOLENT -.171 .170 1.017 1 .313 .843 
NUMEMPL .653 .123 28.222 1 .000 1.922 
NUMOFND .276 .241 1.318 1 .251 1.318 
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SUMMER -.146 .143 1.035 1 .309 .865 
WEEKEND3 -.022 .126 .030 1 .862 .978 
MSFORALCLIC .007 .003 3.776 1 .052 1.007 
OFF1_AGE -.004 .006 .488 1 .485 .996 
OFF_BMI .044 .013 11.790 1 .001 1.045 
OFF1ALC .335 .144 5.440 1 .020 1.398 
OFF1WHT .151 .137 1.223 1 .269 1.163 
OFF1_SEX -.822 .201 16.754 1 .000 .439 
Constant -2.212 .406 29.749 1 .000 .109 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: OFF1_AGE, OFF_BMI, OFF1ALC, OFF1WHT, OFF1_SEX. 
 
 
Block 3: Method = Enter 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.711 3 .634 
Block 1.711 3 .634 




Step -2 Log likelihood 






 .048 .074 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter 


















AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
Step 1 DID BATTERY ON AT LEAST 
ONE OFFICER OCCUR? 
NO BATTERY 1299 12 99.1 
BATTERY AGAINST 1 OR 
MORE OFFICERS 
355 12 3.3 
Overall Percentage   78.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 DTTASER .120 .127 .891 1 .345 1.128 
TIME93A .097 .133 .527 1 .468 1.101 
VIOLENT -.171 .170 1.015 1 .314 .843 
NUMEMPL .650 .123 27.823 1 .000 1.916 
NUMOFND .289 .242 1.422 1 .233 1.335 
SUMMER -.146 .143 1.039 1 .308 .864 
WEEKEND3 -.016 .126 .017 1 .896 .984 
MSFORALCLIC .007 .003 3.855 1 .050 1.007 
OFF1_AGE -.005 .006 .557 1 .455 .995 
OFF_BMI .044 .013 12.012 1 .001 1.045 
OFF1ALC .342 .144 5.643 1 .018 1.408 
OFF1WHT .154 .137 1.258 1 .262 1.166 
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OFF1_SEX -.794 .203 15.332 1 .000 .452 
EMPL1AGE -.006 .009 .462 1 .496 .994 
EMPL1WHT -.030 .141 .044 1 .833 .971 
EMPL1SX -.332 .284 1.369 1 .242 .717 
Constant -1.686 .595 8.027 1 .005 .185 
















Nearest neighbor analysis: 
-------------------------- 
 
    Sample size........: 367 
    Measurement type...: Direct 
    Start time.........: 05:02:00 PM, 02/06/2010 
 
    Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance ..:  640.27 ft 
    Standard Dev of Nearest 
    Neighbor Distance ...............:  1249.97 ft 
    Minimum Distance ................:  0.00 ft 
    Maximum Distance ................:  92027.24 ft 
 
    Based on Bounding Rectangle: 
    Area ............................:  5244620531.50 sq ft 
    Mean Random Distance ............:  1890.14 ft 
    Mean Dispersed Distance .........:  4062.02 ft 
    Nearest Neighbor Index ..........:  0.3387 
    Standard Error ..................:  51.57 ft 
    Test Statistic (Z) ..............:  -24.2346 
    p-value (one tail) ..............:  0.0001 
    p-value (two tail) ..............:  0.0001 
 
             Mean Nearest            Expected Nearest       Nearest 
  Order      Neighbor Distance (m)   Neighbor Distance (m)  Neighbor Index 
  *****      *********************   *********************  ************** 
    1               640.2657              1890.1402              0.33874 
 










Nearest neighbor analysis: 
-------------------------- 
 
    Sample size........: 367 
    Measurement type...: Direct 
    Start time.........: 05:09:39 PM, 02/06/2010 
 
    Mean Nearest Neighbor Distance ..:  640.27 ft 
    Standard Dev of Nearest 
    Neighbor Distance ...............:  1249.97 ft 
    Minimum Distance ................:  0.00 ft 
    Maximum Distance ................:  92027.24 ft 
 
    Based on Bounding Rectangle: 
    Area ............................:  5244620531.50 sq ft 
    Mean Random Distance ............:  1890.14 ft 
    Mean Dispersed Distance .........:  4062.02 ft 
    Nearest Neighbor Index ..........:  0.3387 
    Standard Error ..................:  51.57 ft 
    Test Statistic (Z) ..............:  -24.2346 
    p-value (one tail) ..............:  0.0001 
    p-value (two tail) ..............:  0.0001 
 
             Mean Nearest            Expected Nearest       Nearest 
  Order      Neighbor Distance (m)   Neighbor Distance (m)  Neighbor Index 
  *****      *********************   *********************  ************** 
    1               640.2657              1890.1402              0.33874 
    2              1154.6359              2835.2102              0.40725 
    3              1529.2280              3544.0128              0.43150 
    4              1889.2978              4134.6816              0.45694 
    5              2100.4331              4651.5168              0.45156 
    6              2586.6202              5116.6685              0.50553 
    7              2884.6122              5543.0575              0.52040 
    8              3224.7118              5938.9902              0.54297 
    9              3492.2139              6310.1771              0.55343 
   10              3747.3059              6660.7424              0.56260 
   11              3934.1686              6993.7796              0.56252 
   12              4109.6161              7311.6786              0.56206 
   13              4336.6483              7616.3319              0.56939 
   14              4527.5845              7909.2678              0.57244 
   15              4677.5674              8191.7416              0.57101 
   16              4879.4958              8464.7997              0.57645 
   17              5061.9409              8729.3247              0.57988 
   18              5306.5336              8986.0695              0.59053 
   19              5422.5612              9235.6825              0.58713 
159 
 
   20              5592.4115              9478.7268              0.59000 
   21              5745.6137              9715.6950              0.59137 
   22              6019.0096              9947.0211              0.60511 
   23              6163.8732             10173.0897              0.60590 
   24              6307.4145             10394.2438              0.60682 
   25              6442.4001             10610.7906              0.60716 
   26              6566.2761             10823.0064              0.60670 
   27              6665.0773             11031.1411              0.60421 
   28              6775.5019             11235.4215              0.60305 
   29              6880.8559             11436.0541              0.60168 
   30              7004.2635             11633.2274              0.60209 
   31              7165.3279             11827.1145              0.60584 
   32              7323.3502             12017.8744              0.60937 
   33              7426.3264             12205.6537              0.60843 
   34              7496.1714             12390.5879              0.60499 
   35              7606.7651             12572.8024              0.60502 
   36              7691.4162             12752.4139              0.60313 
   37              7772.1360             12929.5307              0.60112 
   38              7903.8108             13104.2541              0.60315 
   39              8005.0485             13276.6785              0.60294 
   40              8185.6870             13446.8923              0.60874 
   41              8380.6354             13614.9785              0.61555 
   42              8494.2895             13781.0148              0.61638 
   43              8624.0343             13945.0745              0.61843 
   44              8741.8469             14107.2265              0.61967 
   45              8883.9008             14267.5359              0.62267 
   46              9014.4293             14426.0641              0.62487 
   47              9085.9510             14582.8692              0.62306 
   48              9221.4266             14738.0061              0.62569 
   49              9383.0689             14891.5270              0.63009 
   50              9434.3735             15043.4813              0.62714 
   51              9505.4622             15193.9161              0.62561 
   52              9644.1935             15342.8761              0.62858 
   53              9722.4566             15490.4037              0.62764 
   54              9784.5692             15636.5396              0.62575 
   55              9858.6672             15781.3224              0.62470 
   56              9970.3532             15924.7890              0.62609 
   57             10036.9639             16066.9746              0.62470 
   58             10100.1237             16207.9130              0.62316 
   59             10204.0918             16347.6363              0.62419 
   60             10248.8528             16486.1756              0.62166 
   61             10313.9026             16623.5604              0.62044 
   62             10376.0572             16759.8191              0.61910 
   63             10482.8831             16894.9790              0.62047 
   64             10528.5444             17029.0661              0.61827 
   65             10586.1056             17162.1057              0.61683 
   66             10644.5991             17294.1219              0.61550 
   67             10718.9500             17425.1379              0.61514 
   68             10758.8799             17555.1763              0.61286 
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   69             10806.2247             17684.2585              0.61106 
   70             10846.6147             17812.4053              0.60894 
   71             10907.2290             17939.6367              0.60800 
   72             10977.4604             18065.9722              0.60763 
   73             11013.2674             18191.4303              0.60541 
   74             11074.0605             18316.0292              0.60461 
   75             11151.2030             18439.7861              0.60474 
   76             11234.9613             18562.7180              0.60524 
   77             11295.8870             18684.8412              0.60455 
   78             11342.6988             18806.1713              0.60314 
   79             11416.2739             18926.7237              0.60318 
   80             11573.2875             19046.5131              0.60763 
   81             11718.1094             19165.5538              0.61142 
   82             11824.1937             19283.8597              0.61317 
   83             11896.8641             19401.4442              0.61319 
   84             11984.2872             19518.3204              0.61400 
   85             12087.1945             19634.5009              0.61561 
   86             12172.3382             19749.9979              0.61632 
   87             12258.0561             19864.8235              0.61707 
   88             12310.4812             19978.9891              0.61617 
   89             12385.1897             20092.5061              0.61641 
   90             12448.9659             20205.3854              0.61612 
   91             12507.0238             20317.6375              0.61557 
   92             12599.7185             20429.2729              0.61675 
   93             12664.7699             20540.3015              0.61658 
   94             12746.1281             20650.7333              0.61722 
   95             12784.4109             20760.5776              0.61580 
   96             12825.2034             20869.8438              0.61453 
   97             12909.1074             20978.5409              0.61535 
   98             12957.7597             21086.6777              0.61450 
   99             13016.8190             21194.2628              0.61417 
  100             13062.1492             21301.3045              0.61321 
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